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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
 
 
WHAT TYPES OF U.S. COMPANIES JOIN THE UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL 
COMPACT? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF VOLUNTARY INITIATIVE 
ENGAGEMENT COMPARING THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE, REGULATORY 
AVOIDANCE, AND NEW MORAL MARKETPLACE APPROACHES 
 
Previous literature on voluntary initiatives indicates that companies are more 
likely to join if they are large, diverse, profitable and are experiencing more regulatory 
oversight. While these findings are interesting, they have yet to be replicated among a 
sample of United States companies in the case of the United Nations Global Compact. 
Thus, this study draws upon corporate social responsibility literature as it relates to the 
United Nation‟s Global Compact to explore the relationship between Global Compact 
participation, company characteristics, regulatory oversight, and regulatory violations. 
The data for this analysis comes from the United Nations Global Compact Office, 
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission EDGAR database, the 
Environmental Protection Agency‟s Enforcement & Compliance History Online Database, 
the Dun & Bradstreet Million Dollar Database, Reference USA, along with selected 
corporate websites. The sample consists of 70 companies that joined the Global Compact 
and 70 companies that did not join the Global Compact. 
Logistic regression analysis suggests that the number of Securities and Exchange 
Commission litigation documents filed against each company increases the likelihood of 
iii 
 
Global Compact participation, as does the size of the company (seen with both sales 
totals and employees per company); additionally, companies based in manufacturing are 
also more likely to sign into the Global Compact. Surprisingly, previous environmental 
compliance was not associated with participation in the Global Compact. This finding 
suggests that U.S. companies that join the Global Compact are not “good” or “bad” 
environmental actors. This study is unique in that findings suggest companies that join 
the Global Compact appear to be driven primarily by economic regulation as opposed to 
environmental regulation. 
 Zachary Patrick Watne 
Department of Sociology 
Colorado State University 
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Chapter I. INTRODUCTION 
What motivates corporate behavior? This question has been extensively examined 
by researchers studying a variety of topics, such as corporate crime and regulation 
(Alvesalo et al. 2006), voluntary decision making (Hess, Rogovsky and Dunfee 2002), 
company compliance (Parker and Nielsen 2009), securities fraud (Perino 1998), corporate 
political donations (Schuler 2008), corporate philanthropy (Murray 2004), and corporate 
governance (Arthaud-Day 2005). Many companies claim that their behavior is motivated 
by their desire to be socially responsible as opposed to their desire to seek profits and 
expand. Despite such claims, there is an abundance of documented reports of companies 
adopting a socially responsible business atmosphere while simultaneously violating 
various laws or regulations. Such behavior draws interest and scrutiny from civil and 
government agencies, along with legions of researchers. 
Corporations have a significant influence on society and are being looked to for 
positive contribution beyond standard business practices (Warhurst 2005). This attention 
is further perpetuated by the impact of corporations on our daily lives. They control the 
banks where we invest our money, the stores where we purchase our food, the companies 
that help us connect with one another via phone, internet, radio, and television, and the 
factories where the cars, bikes, trains, planes, and buses that get us to and from our places 
of work and recreation are built. All of this is just the tip of their ever-expanding 
influential iceberg. If all large corporations disappeared tomorrow, we could go into a 
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technological and information dark age for a significant period until, more likely than not, 
other corporations would organize. 
Due to this influence, as well as the clouded and amorphous pledges of social 
responsibly by U.S. corporations, this work extends the research in the area of corporate 
motivations toward compliance changes, specifically examining the differences between 
corporations that have and have not joined a particular voluntary initiative, the United 
Nations Global Compact (detailed later). Companies within the U.S. are used due to the 
availability of comprehensive information needed for analysis, along with the propensity 
of U.S. companies to tout themselves as being involved in their communities and creating 
their own corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives. Looking over major corporate 
websites, the terms “corporate responsibility” or “responsible citizen” can be found 
linking to stories detailing both internal company goals and mission statements along 
with stories of civic achievements (Coca-Cola 2010; DuPont 2010; Ford Motor Co. 2010). 
In attempting to determine what differences exist between companies that have 
and those that have not signed the Global Compact (GC), the larger question of 
motivating factors behind corporate social responsibility becomes the structure of the 
analysis. Although the Global Compact is not a measure of the entirety of a company‟s 
commitment to their community (however they define “commitment”), the GC is a 
method for adhering to the broad concepts of corporate social responsibility through a set 
of principles that companies agree to abide by. After looking at the variety of literature in 
this area, the Global Compact, a non-binding multilateral initiative created in early 2000 
to help companies align their activities to those of the general corporate social 
responsibility movement, became the focal point of this work and the analysis throughout. 
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There has not been a comparable study that looks at the Global Compact and all 
companies within one country (the U.S. in this study) that have signed it; nor has there 
been a comparison of companies within the same social context. The intention of this 
study is to see whether there are significant differences between the companies that have 
signed the Global Compact compared with other companies within the U.S. that have not 
signed it. Specifically, the focus is to see how signees of the GC compare with other 
companies in the U.S. in relation to their company characteristics, environmental and 
regulatory performances, and the pressures they are under from governmental agencies in 
these areas, and how that matches up with  previous literature on voluntary initiatives. 
This works aims to answer the following questions: How do U.S.-based companies that 
have signed the Global Compact compare with other companies in the United States? If 
differences exist, do they match up to previous research on voluntary initiatives, and to 
what degree? 
Determining if there is a relationship between environmental and regulatory 
pressures on companies and their engagement in voluntary initiatives is important given 
the current debate between those involved in the corporate social responsibility 
movement and the movement‟s critics. There is disagreement on the motivations driving 
companies to engage in corporate social responsibility, with one side claiming that there 
is a newly unearthed “moral marketplace” where companies feel obligated to contribute 
to the communities they reside in (Hess et al. 2002). If this is true and companies are 
ethically driven to participate in measures of corporate social responsibility, then a 
negative relationship between violations and participation in the Global Compact is 
expected. Companies choose to engage in voluntary initiatives because they either are 
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actively seeking ways to be involved in different types of corporate social responsibility 
or feel obligated to participate due to some internal drive within the company, meaning 
they should have lower violations compared with companies without these motivations. 
The inverse argument of the “new moral marketplace” (Hess et al. 2002) stance 
contends that companies are not interested in actual engagement with, or the values of, 
corporate social responsibility and its potential benefits; they are simply looking for 
camouflage to hide their wrongdoings. If this is the case, then a lack of association, or a 
positive association, would indicate that companies are either joining the Global Compact 
as a symbolic gesture without any actions behind their commitment or that they are trying 
to offset the potential negative image that the company may be accumulating through 
violations of rules enforced by regulatory agencies. The Global Compact would then be 
an instrument for touting oneself as a “responsible” actor without having to make any real 
changes to the companies‟ processes that brought about the regulatory pressure and 
violations. If this is the case, it is expected that these companies may actually have higher 
numbers of violations than those companies that have not signed into the Global Compact. 
There is yet a third argument being made in the voluntary initiative literature, 
which centers on companies engaging in voluntary initiatives not due to a moral 
obligation or in an attempt to conceal their wrongdoings; it is argued that instead, they are 
doing so to gain a competitive advantage over other firms (Hess et al. 2002). This line of 
reasoning focuses on a company‟s abilities to capture and maintain a prominent position 
in either their industry or community through voluntarily changing their business 
practices for the betterment of those they interact with. These three concepts – regulatory 
avoidance, new moral marketplace, and competitive advantage – will be the framework 
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of the argument throughout this work and the base of the concluding analysis. 
Organization of Research  
To understand the Global Compact (GC), it is important to first understand why it 
was created. Chapter II focuses on the definition, background, and types of social 
responsibility being discussed by various researchers. This work both provides a basic 
understanding and increases the readers‟ overall awareness of the social responsibility 
movement and the different aspects that are commonly discussed in relation to this 
movement. Related to corporate social responsibility, the following topics are discussed: 
a brief history of the CSR movement, a description of how companies get involved in 
CSR practices, details of the ways that CSR affects communities, an explanation of how 
CSR and regulations are intertwined, and a discussion of the relationship between CSR 
and corporate power. This chapter also covers various models of CSR and the issues with 
its implementation. 
Within the CSR movement are talks of voluntary initiatives, actions, or plans that 
corporations put into place to either positively influence the community around them or 
avoid regulatory actions through a variety of methods. Chapter III explores reasons why 
companies become involved in voluntary initiatives such as the Global Compact, largely 
focusing on the three concepts introduced above (regulatory avoidance, new moral 
marketplace, and competitive advantages). This chapter also details some of the forms 
voluntary initiatives take besides the GC. The history of the GC, how it functions, its 
current global reach, how companies join the program, and how it relates to this research 




In Chapter V, methodological details are provided to indicate how the data were 
accumulated, along with a discussion of the variables that are used and the coding 
scheme of those variables. Connections are made between the variables being used in the 
analysis and the reasons that companies join voluntary initiatives or become active in the 
CSR movement. The following chapter, Chapter VI, is the analysis section of the work 
describing the initial comparisons of company characteristics, along with the findings of 
the logistic regression models created from the data collected. This work concludes with 
a further discussion of the findings. An interpretation of the findings and the discussion of 
















Chapter II. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 This chapter provides an overview of the use of the term CSR, the ways that it is 
viewed based on the perspectives of the organizations involved, the motivations that 
corporations have for engaging in it, and the forms that it takes. 
What is CSR? 
 The term corporate social responsibility (CSR) has a variety of meanings. 
Researchers, politicians, business professionals, non-governmental organization 
representatives, and consumer society have all used the term, and yet, there is not a 
conclusive definition that can be applied accurately in each conversation. To add to the 
confusion, the term CSR is used to describe different ideas and actions even within these 
various circles (Windsor 2001: 229). Due to the multitude of definitions, CSR has been 
referred to as the “CSR Labyrinth” (Cordoba 2008: 359), with few people sharing the 
same opinion of what it means and how, and when, it should be applied. In short, there is 
consensus among CSR scholars that there is no single definition of the concept (Windsor 
2001: 227). 
Corporate social responsibility is defined rather vaguely as entities “being 
concerned with the relationship between companies and society and in particular, with 
constraining the adverse impacts of corporate activity on individuals and communities as 
a whole” (Whitehouse 2003: 300-301). Whitehouse argues that businesses are trying to 
avoid negative repercussions that company actions may have on individuals or groups in 
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the societies where these companies are based. Anderson (1989: 9) defines CSR more 
altruistically, stating that the movement is based on an obligation “to take proper legal, 
moral-ethical, and philanthropic actions that will protect and improve the welfare of both 
society and business as a whole.” Vies (2004), in contrast, argues that CSR is largely 
concerned with compliance to various regulations, while also going beyond what is 
expected:  
The practices of the corporation that, as part of their corporate strategy, 
complementary and in support of the main business activities, explicitly seek to 
avoid damage and promote the well-being of stakeholders (clients, suppliers, 
employees, financial resource providers, community, government and the 
environment) by complying with current rules and regulations and voluntarily 
going beyond those requirements. (45) 
 
Though just a sampling of the spectrum of CSR definitions, these examples encapsulate 
the general mission statement of the CSR movement: connecting companies to society in 
a positive fashion, or at least minimizing the detrimental effects that they have on the 
individuals and communities they come into contact with. This is the loose definition of 
CSR used in this work. Still, there are many facets of CSR that need to be examined by 
taking a brief look at the history of CSR and how it has become common vernacular 
among researchers and corporate executives alike. 
Brief History of CSR 
 Wulfson (2001) provides a historical overview of the major CSR efforts 
undertaken in the United States since the late 1800s, starting with Andrew Carnegie‟s 
philanthropic actions and the various foundations, libraries, and endowments that he 
established. Wulfson also describes the impact that several foundations have had on 
social welfare (e.g., the Rockefellers, Fords, and more recently Gates). Although these 
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individuals had ample fortunes to be able to spare some of their wealth for such projects, 
and many did not engage in these activities until after they had accumulated wealth and 
left the competitive marketplace, their actions changed the views of what corporations, 
and excess money, can do for American society (Windsor 2001: 230). Wulfson (2001) 
argues that with the benefits enjoyed through profitable corporations, there also comes an 
ethical responsibility to give back to those who helped contribute to those fortunes. She 
quotes Henry Ford as saying, “A business that makes nothing but money is a poor kind of 
business,” arguing that there is more to the venture of profit seeking than simply keeping 
it within the confines of the company that generates it. Berlet (1936) points out that since 
the onset of the 20
th
 century, conversations about CSR began focusing on how companies‟ 
managers started to take more than profit seeking into consideration when they acted on 
behalf of the companies they worked for. However, these conversations have evolved and 
have been amplified tremendously in the past couple decades, both in favor of and in 
opposition to CSR. What began by examining the decisions of managers within 
companies has now expanded to become the focal point of non-governmental 
organizations and a variety of corporate watchdog groups, and has even flourished in the 
business community. CSR is now tied to debates about environmental crime and 
regulation, human rights, corporate strategic marketing, company image retention and 
morphing, entrepreneurship, community organization practices, along with various other 
actors and actions far beyond simple management preferences. To understand why CSR 
has influenced such a broad array of topics and groups, it is important to understand what 




Motivations for Engaging in CSR 
Although the term corporate social responsibility can be perceived as an 
unnecessary hurdle, or chore, for a company to become entangled in, there are those who 
see it otherwise. Porter and Kramer go so far as to say that “CSR has emerged as an 
inescapable priority for business leaders in every country,” and “CSR can be much more 
than a cost, a constraint, or charitable deed – it can be a source of opportunity, innovation, 
and competitive advantage” (2006: 1). Corporations can gain from CSR practices, and so 
can the societies that these corporations are based in. To exemplify the benefits of CSR, 
both within and outside of a company, Roger Troub (1977) states: 
The environment of the large corporation is the society, and the reduction of 
social problems enhances the environment in which the corporation exists. 
Consequently, socially responsible behavior, as it is thought of in this case, is 
feasible and desirable both for the corporation and for society. (99) 
Companies that operate in healthy environments benefit from increased profit-potential, 
market expansion, employee retention, and increased morale (Amato 2007; Einhorn 2007; 
Troub 1977). This is not only true in the short run, as when companies provide services 
for a community, thereby generating positive media coverage (and some philanthropic 
advertising), but the long-term benefits of a healthy society also lead to more productive 
and healthier firms (Troub 1977: 100). In looking over numerous corporate annual reports 
from companies such as Exxon, Pfizer, Coca-Cola Enterprises, Merck, Manpower, etc., 
there is a consistent theme of continual growth or expansion within their markets.
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Literature covering the health of corporations and their future plans also points to growth 
as a barometer for stability and health within a company and across industries (Goth 2009; 
                                                 
1
 Annual reports can be found on their respective corporate websites. 
2
 http://walmartstores.com/CommunityGiving/ Accessed Nov 30, 2009. 
3
 Hess et al. (2002) argue that the concept of comparative advantage is important for understanding the 
mechanisms driving companies to engage in voluntary initiatives; they also note, however, that it is most 
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Ramayana, Semen, and Alan 2002; Brush, Bromley and Hendricks. 2000; Coven, Levin, 
and Heeled 1999). For most plants, people, or corporations to grow, there must be an 
environment suitable for that growth; for corporations, that environment is the stability of 
the communities, towns, and nations that they are based in. Although CSR alone cannot 
bring about these healthy environments, the practices that some corporations engage in 
under the umbrella of CSR can help foster thriving communities. 
When companies act in socially responsible ways, it increases the public‟s 
perception of these companies. Marne Arthur-Day (2005: 1) reports that nearly 20 percent 
of individuals would not buy from a store or work for a company with poor CSR 
practices. Moreover, another 20 percent of individuals would weigh the evidence and 
then decide whether to boycott stores and products. Thus, companies stand to lose up to 
40 percent of their customers when perceptions of their CSR are negative. This threat to 
profit has caused some CSR researchers to question whether companies engage in 
greenwashing (Simons 2004; Greer and Bruno 1996). Most forms of greenwashing occur 
when companies appear to engage in activities that seem to change their environmental or 
social performances but in fact are simply using cover-up campaigns to hide their true 
actions and intentions (Whitehouse 2006; Videras 2000; Greer and Bruno 1996). For 
example, in 1999, Phillip Morris spent $100 million dollars advertising its $75 million in 
charitable donations (Porter and Kramer 2002). Greer and Bruno (1996) describe multiple 
instances of companies claiming to be acting in responsible ways while at the same time 
contradicting their statements. Examples include Mobile Corporation intentionally 
advertizing their trash bags as biodegradable, when in fact they are not, simply to 
capitalize on an increasingly environmentally concerned public. Another example is 
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when ASEA Brown Bovary Ltd., a Swiss-based power company, claims to be focused on 
renewable, “clean,” energy sources and yet devote very little of their research and 
development dollars toward this promise, instead increasingly focusing on fossil fuels. 
This tactic can also be seen when examining the continual advertising campaigns of Wal-
Mart and other major retailers with their self-contradictory “commitments to community” 
campaigns, embracing one aspect of the CSR movement and yet continually relying on 
overseas products, employees, and factories founded on dangerous and unstable working 
conditions (Green 2001; Wal-Mart 20092). This creation of false company profiles and 
covering up violations can lead organizations to stronger consumer bases and positive 
images in the markets they are connected to. Although the issue whether companies 
engage in real CSR behaviors or simply use CSR terminology to help greenwash their 
public image is a viable and important question that has been explored by others (Greer 
and Bruno 1996, for example), it is not the focus of this work. This relationship between 
empty promises and measurable actions will be discussed in more detail later in this 
chapter. 
A number of companies that engage in CSR activities have done so to improve 
public perception about their business practices (Porter and Kramer 2006), but there are 
also companies that have started to refine their business practices after having been 
caught violating human rights, environmental laws, or rules of ethical behaviors. Simon 
Zadek details this type of occurrence when he discusses Nike‟s change from “the poster 
child for irresponsibility to a leader in progressive practices” (2004: 1). Nike is only one 
example of a company being caught in the spotlight of enforcement; Zadek also mentions 
Shell and Danish pharmaceutical company Novo Nordisk as other companies in positive-
                                                 
2
 http://walmartstores.com/CommunityGiving/ Accessed Nov 30, 2009. 
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transition periods. These companies have been forced to change their practices through 
constant supervision and are said to be focusing on the larger picture of their actions, not 
solely on immediate gains, although only time will tell whether real changes have come 
about due to this increased scrutiny. 
Zadek (2004: 127) details five stages that companies go through to transition to 
more socially responsible actions and strategies: defensive, compliance, managerial, 
strategic, and civil. While in the defensive stage, corporations often deny the practices, 
outcomes, or responsibility for the problems that they have caused. They try to separate 
themselves from the problem and hope that no further light will be shed on their actions. 
The compliance stage focuses on adopting a policy-based approach of adhering to the 
rules that a company has violated and to other potential rules they fear they may not be in 
compliance with. In the managerial stage, they “embed the social issues into their core 
management practices,” and further this in the strategic stage, when they use those social 
issues to help form their business strategies (128). Lastly, in the civil stage, they 
“promote broad industry participation” in socially responsible actions and attitudes, 
trying to drive other companies to abide by current or proposed standards (128). While 
not every company goes through these stages, Zadek does provide a framework that 
assists in understanding the potential steps that non-compliant corporations move through 
to build themselves up to becoming more socially responsible organizations. The GC 
seems to be a mix of both the managerial stage, in that it is looking to change the 
corporate compass to guide future CSR-based practices, and the civil stage, since it is a 
champion of the CSR movement. This practice of broad-reaching CSR focus and 
implementation is often referred to as the “triple bottom line of economic, social, and 
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environmental performance” (Porter and Kramer 2006: 3). 
Companies that are not profitable tend to be limited in their devotion of time and 
resources aimed at corporate social responsibility; economic stability is essential if 
corporations are considering becoming involved in any kind of CSR endeavor. Without 
economic stability, companies are unable to engage in CSR effectively, or in any kind of 
duration, since they will cease to operate without generating profits (Porter 2006; 
Friedman 1977). Once companies have been able to reach a level of freedom afforded by 
profitability, they can benefit from socially responsible actions in a number of ways. 
Archie Carroll (1998) describes the U.S.-based company Chick-fil-a as an exemplar of 
both a financially sound company and a good corporate citizen. This company has such 
an extensive network of altruistic enterprises that this network alone looks like a separate 
corporate structure, including: “a charitable foundation, ten foster homes, a summer camp, 
two separate scholarship programs, and a number of one-on-one programs with children,” 
not to mention the fact that they remain closed on Sundays to give their employees time 
away from work and with their families (Carroll 1998: 6). With a chain of more than 700 
restaurants and a steadily increasing sales record, Chick-fil-a is just one example of how 
a company can be good at both profit generation and corporate citizenship, though again, 
profitability is essential in order to maintain their community-driven efforts (Carroll 1998: 
4). 
When companies change their practices to the extent that they are giving back to 
society through programs and foundations, these philanthropic efforts can help the 
companies see where their abilities are best utilized within the needs of a community. 
These changes can often help them in gaining advantageous connections with other 
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companies both in their own industry and in complementary ones, along with improving 
perceptions in the communities they belong to (Porter and Kramer 2006: 3-4). 
Structures of CSR 
Communities are heavily influenced by the actions of companies and businesses 
that operate in or near them (Whitehouse 2003: 302). This is true through both direct 
action and the externalities of the actions that corporations engage in (Lee and McKenzie 
1994: 973). If a company decides to adopt an environmentally friendly business practice, 
or starts a new foundation to help solve a particular social problem, that action has ripple 
effects in that community, changing the social and commercial landscapes. Companies 
are often aware of these changes, and many of the more proactive corporations have 
started to plan accordingly. Companies realize their importance to, and influence on, the 
communities that they are based in, and have thus included some CSR practices into their 
strategic planning from their inception (Marx 1995: 185). Other companies that have 
been around since before the CSR conversation existed are now currently changing their 
business practices to benefit both themselves and their communities. Corporations are 
increasingly looking to find ways to connect to the communities they are a part of, and 
because of this, they have adapted different socially responsible, or have avoided 
irresponsible, business practices. Unfortunately, due to the sheer size of some of these 
corporations, it is difficult to gauge whether they are acting in socially responsible ways 
or are simply claiming to do so (Whitehouse 2003: 302). This ambiguous situation leads 





CSR can be seen as a reaction to correct business practices going forward, but it 
may also be a response to avoid further regulations being imposed on corporations‟ 
activities. Problematic and harmful corporate behavior can cause lawmakers and the 
public to push for more corporate regulations (Whitehouse 2003: 303). Consequently, a 
company publically identified for unethical or harmful business practices can create an 
atmosphere that is supportive of new corporate regulation, which Troub (1977: 98) argues 
can influence positive corporate behavior because it forces other companies to comply 
with the law. Two examples of this type of policy change coming about through corporate 
misdeeds are the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Policies Act and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(Carroll 1998: 3). The Foreign Corrupt Policies Act was enacted after a series of 
corporate bribery scandals, particularly involving large amounts of money being paid to 
foreign officials, came to the public‟s attention. More recently, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 was created due to the false and unethical accounting practices by companies such 
as Enron, Tyco International, and WorldCom. 
The concerns over corporate wrongdoings have been heightened since 
corporations have been able to amass a considerable influence during the past century as 
they have increased their economic and social power (Bruno and Karliner 2002: 34). 
Proponents of CSR argue that companies must also be more responsible because of that 
increased power (Porter and Kramer 2006; Whitehouse 2003; Bruno 2002; Lee 1994; 
Troub 1977). Lisa Whitehouse (2003: 303) argues that “if companies wish to continue to 
exercise public power then that power has to be made legitimate.” She further argues that 
since corporations “make private decisions which have public results,” their power needs 
to be both understood and scrutinized (Whitehouse 2003: 302). 
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When companies use socially responsible practices wisely, they are able to 
increase their power both in the markets and in the communities in which they operate 
(Porter 2006: 14). Marx (1999: 185) states that CSR can give a company a competitive 
advantage, but argues that it is more common with companies that have a more refined 
“corporate strategy” or utilizing “strategic philanthropy.” Companies use focused 
corporate giving campaigns to target particular audiences in order to bolster their image 
and increase their market potential. For instance, Mentor Graphics Corp., a software 
manufacturer, provided a little over $100 million in contributions in 1994, most of which 
were computer programs and software to various colleges and universities (Wulfson 2001: 
137). This type of industry-specific CSR is easier for the companies to maintain. In 
addition, this improved positive image can often manifest in further or continued 
patronage by those they are providing services to (in this case the students, faculty, and 
employees of the university), which often leads to increased profits for the corporation 
and power within their industry. 
Arguments against CSR 
 One of the more vocal opponents of CSR was Milton Friedman, the Nobel Prize 
winning American economist, a proponent of laissez-faire capitalism who thought that 
the idea of companies being held responsible for anything more than simply going about 
their business was not only wrong but itself irresponsible. He stated in a speech at 
Pepperdine University in 1977: 
Doing good with other people‟s money has two basic flaws. In the first place, you 
never spend anybody else‟s money as carefully as you spend your own, so a large 
fraction of that money is inevitably wasted. In the second place, and equally 
important, you cannot do good with other people‟s money unless you first get the 
money away from them. (Friedman 1977: 335) 
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He, among others, argues that the only responsibility a corporation has is to generate 
profits (Friedman 1977; Atkins 2006; Silber 1996). Lee and McKenzie (1994: 970) 
continue this argument stating that corporations should only use shareholders‟ money, the 
revenues generated by the companies they own stock in, to increase future share values. 
Companies should not focus on “bettering” the communities in which they operate; 
instead, “responsibilities lie with individuals, not organizations” to accomplish this 
(Silber 1996: 1). 
 Many authors, even those in favor of CSR, point out that corporations are often 
good at what they do but are not necessarily the best at solving, or attempting to solve, 
societal problems (Atkins 2006; Porter 2006; Windsor 2001; Troub 1977). Troub 
questions whether corporations are best suited to decide which problems are most 
important to address in society, given their lack of information and connection to many of 
the issues (1977: 99). He argues that the problems of society are best solved by groups 
with the most knowledge about the issues, not corporations looking to distribute 
charitable contributions in order to increase positive publicity. 
Utting (2007: 700) suggests that many companies lack the mechanisms to engage 
in socially responsible behavior or to gauge whether their behaviors and policies are 
socially responsible. Although regulations are often the cause of shifts to more socially 
responsible actions, regulations cannot be counted on as a positive incentive, or a 
negative deterrent, pushing or pulling corporations to embrace the broad CSR movement, 
if not simply because “laws tend to lag behind ethics” (Whitehouse 2003: 305). If 
companies are only going to abide by the rules put into place and nothing more, there will 
be a continuous, drawn-out practice of a company overstepping its bounds or creating 
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environmental degradation, a regulator noticing this violation and making the necessary 
changes in protocol, followed by the company pushing its limits in another direction. 
While some corporations continue to engage in the minimal amount of sanction avoiding 
actions to get under the regulatory radars, their increased power and visibility in society 
make it more difficult for them to go unnoticed. 
With respect to the environment, it is also argued that determining why 
corporations engage in seemingly socially responsible actions is difficult, at best. This is 
where the greenwashing argument is rooted. The concept of greenwashing is best 
described as companies “creatively manag[ing] their reputations with the public, financial 
community, and regulators” in an effort to “hide deviance, deflect attributions of fault, 
obscure the nature of the problem or allegation, reattribute blame, ensure an entity‟s 
reputation and, finally, seek to appear in a leadership position” (Laufer 2003: 255). 
Companies are looking to change their image in the eyes of all those whom they seek to 
impress (current and future customers, investors, regulatory committees, etc.). Silber 
(1996) states that companies: 
sometimes [do so] because they believe it helps them from a public-relations 
standpoint, and sometimes because there‟s someone at the company who believes 
it‟s the right thing to do, even if the environmental group [that they are providing 
funds to] is advocating policies that would put the corporation out of business. (1) 
Since many corporations safeguard reports of their activities, it is difficult to tell whether 
they have chosen to become better citizens or if they are simply displaying an image of 
having improved their actions without any real changes taking place, further supporting 
the greenwashing argument. Some companies are not actually trying to better their 
practices; they are merely trying to put a silver varnish on their old ways. A large number 
of corporations that promote CSR also argue for fewer regulations and more flexible 
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business parameters (Utting 2007: 701). Companies often select business practices that 
are easy to change or abide by (perhaps changing light bulbs to low-wattage versions, 
such as LED or florescent ones) while avoiding changes to problem areas with greater 
importance (unfair labor standards in overseas factories). Utting, a proponent of socially 
responsible behaviors, argues that one of the main problems is that CSR practices are 
done in a piece-work, unregulated fashion, which makes it hard to distinguish between 
those corporations that genuinely want to make a difference and those that just want the 
public relations credit for acting in such a manner (2007: 700-703). This debate between 
greenwashing and meaningful CSR practices is, and will continue to be, an ongoing 
discussion given the difficulty of ascertaining the true reasons behind corporate 
responsibility practices. 
Future of CSR 
Although there are those who doubt the CSR agenda and its importance, the fact 
remains that the majority of the discussion about socially responsible actions is still 
relatively new and evolving (Marx 1999: 15). Some think that it is an individual‟s 
responsibility to choose which companies he or she does business with and that 
customers alone are responsible for purchasing products from companies that share their 
values (Silber 1996: 1). Atkins argues that if people really want companies to behave in 
more socially responsible ways, they should assist in the efforts. For example, a company 
should offer the same product at two prices, the higher cost of the product being tied 
directly to social programs or foundations that customers can choose to support if they 
would like (2006: 28). Companies in different industries feel more pressure to change 
their business practices, as has been seen by the increase in CSR practices among service-
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oriented companies compared with manufacturing-based ones (Marx 1999). Much of this 
is due to more public exposure, but it is also an attempt to expand corporate market 
power and brand identification (Marx 1999: 196). If executives do not want to feel the 
brunt of the blame being placed on their corporations that violate laws and regulations, 
then they should distance themselves from those organizations; the companies should not 
have to change their practices to fit the preferences of the individuals in charge (Silber 
1996: 1). Advocates for and proponents of the CSR movement are still actively trying to 
















Chapter III. VOLUNTARY INITIATIVES 
 Through both internal drives and external pressures, companies are pushed toward 
and pulled into increased CSR awareness. The continuous public pressure for companies 
to be held accountable for their actions is forcing them to change their policies and 
practices. While some claim to do so for the betterment of society, or as a measure to 
ward off governmental agencies by patching up procedures that violate current 
regulations, there are others that implement new policies to avoid increased regulation in 
the future (Whitehouse 2006). These new programs, or initiatives, come in a variety of 
forms and are often voluntary. Corporations are not being forced to sign up for or create 
them, but they are certainly being guided in that direction either from a feeling within the 
company or a pressure from their surroundings, be it the market or governmental 
agencies. Some firms do not want to get involved in voluntary initiatives out of fear of 
being linked to them perpetually (Einhorn 2007: 568), but the general trend is that 
companies are becoming increasingly involved in one or more programs (Simons 2004:  
131). 
Commonalities of Voluntary Initiatives 
 Hess et al. (2002: 112) argue that successful voluntary initiatives have three main 
components to them: the “programs are connected to the core values of the firm”; they 
are linked to the “core competencies of the firm”; and they are evaluated and 
communicated to the shareholders of the company. Since they are connected to the core 
23 
 
values of organizations, the programs often reflect what leadership feels are the more 
pressing issues in the communities they are based in. Corporations often use their 
resources to fill those societal voids. Examples of this include UPS delivering needed 
food and supplies via their shipping routes to communities after disasters, and IBM and 
Intel providing computer training programs and equipment to various causes in need of 
their expertise (Hess et al. 2002: 111). This process of using the competencies of the 
corporation has become more popular since companies can use their day-to-day abilities 
to help small groups of people, entire communities, or individuals with a variety of 
projects and campaigns. Internal corporate actions are evaluated on a yearly to monthly 
basis and voluntary programs that capitalize on existing company resources are often 
significantly more cost efficient and effective than donations to local charities (Hess et al. 
2002). This is particularly true if the company gets employees to donate their time to 
causes, meaning few out of pocket expenses through utilizing the tools and resources at 
hand. The key to successful voluntary initiatives is that companies need to set clear goals, 
both for themselves and for the other groups involved. This often involves establishing a 
costs-benefits analysis of the program prior to, and following, its implementation (Hess et 
al. 2002: 121). Alberini and Segerson (2002: 157) argue that a further measure of success 
is seeing if a firm‟s payoff is “at least as high as it would be without participation, i.e., the 
firm must perceive some gain (or at least no net loss) from participation.” Even 
companies with the most altruistic intentions want to see how their programs are 





Why Companies Join Voluntary Initiatives 
 There are several factors influencing the likelihood of a company joining 
voluntary initiatives, ranging from different characteristics that organizations have (large 
sales volumes or numbers of employees, discussed further in the methodology section) to 
more general characteristics. Hess et al. (2002: 112) argue that there are three main 
reasons why companies engage in voluntary initiatives: (1) to gain a competitive 
advantage in the markets they are a part of, (2) to show that they are part of the new 
moral marketplace, and/or (3) to gain a comparative advantage while being concerned 
with the problems of society. This research draws upon the literature on voluntary 
initiatives to expand two of these possible motives (“competitive advantage” and “new 
moral marketplace”), while it also includes regulatory avoidance as a potential fourth 
reason companies engage in initiatives, in this case the GC.
3
 
Gaining Competitive Advantage 
 Corporate images are often the main reference for current and potential customers. 
Brammer (2005: 30) argues that there are two strategic goals for voluntary initiatives that 
help bolster corporate images: companies want to either “demonstrate their social 
responsiveness to the communities in which they operate” or stimulate general goodwill 
within those communities. Voluntary initiatives help to build positive company images, 
which can increase revenues. Khanna et al. (2007: 753) claim that companies decide to 
engage in voluntary initiatives to “influence markets for their products, obtain higher 
                                                 
3
 Hess et al. (2002) argue that the concept of comparative advantage is important for understanding the 
mechanisms driving companies to engage in voluntary initiatives; they also note, however, that it is most 
often found in developing countries (due to new industries forming). In mature industries embedded in 
developed countries, it is often only distinguishable (i.e., measureable) between private and public firms. 
This work primarily examines public companies in the U.S. and thus does not include the category of 
comparative advantage in the analysis. 
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prices for their products, and lower the cost of labor, capital, and environmental 
regulations.” Companies are not merely trying to change the environment in which they 
are operating; they are looking to benefit directly from that change. Thus, companies may 
approach the GC as they would approach advertising. Those with the most resources 
would be more likely to join the GC (Amato and Amato 2007). 
There are a number of economic benefits companies can reap when they engage 
in voluntary initiatives, but a “better corporate image and reputation are arguably the 
most important of these benefits” (Hess et al. 2002: 113). Two of the variables used in 
this analysis, which assist companies in gaining a competitive advantage, are related to 
company size: sales totals and the number of employees a firm has on staff. Arguments 
have been made (Amato and Amato 2007; Bennie et al. 2007) that larger firms are more 
likely to engage in voluntary initiatives due to their ability to use more resources to join 
and leverage their participation in voluntary initiatives. Smaller firms may want to 
become involved in initiatives but are unable to come up with the necessary resources to 
participate. Thus, voluntary initiatives allow large companies to market themselves in a 
way that may help them gain a competitive advantage over smaller companies that do not 
join initiatives. 
Amato and Amato (2007) also argue that smaller firms, those highly connected to 
their social environments, are more likely to become involved in voluntary initiatives so 
they can promote themselves as being aware and active in their communities. This small-
company connection to a community, or ability to make use of local resources for an 
initiative, gives firms a new angle to market themselves, thus potentially increasing their 
competitive advantage. Amato and Amato‟s findings that small firms are likely to engage 
26 
 
in voluntary initiatives will also be part of the analysis in this work. 
New Moral Marketplace 
Many voluntary initiative researchers claim that the norms of the business 
community are changing and that more companies are leaning toward voluntary 
approaches to improve social problems (Vogel 2008: 262). Thus, companies have become 
increasingly responsive to morally charged issues in their environment, which has 
escalated the responses to those causes. Hess et al. (2002: 115) claim that “while 
managers have a basic duty to undertake actions to maximize shareholder value, they also 
have an obligation to respond to and anticipate existing and changing marketplace 
morality relevant to the firm” (emphasis added). Much of this is due to the drive to keep 
pace with the CSR actions of other firms or to match the expectations of their customer 
base. This is true not only for the outward actions of business; employees also examine 
the core values of prospective employers (Hess et al. 2002). The environment in which 
corporations exist is evolving to become more receptive to ethical issues, and because of 
this, their attitude toward CSR, and their subsequent actions, have changed as well. This 
change in attitudes toward voluntary initiatives is reflected in a statement posted on 
DuPont‟s website (2010), talking about the Global Compact: 
The DuPont core values of innovation and discovery, safety and environmental 
stewardship, integrity and high ethical standards, and treating people fairly and 
with respect meet and in many respects exceed the goals embodied in the values 
set out in the Global Compact. 
These words are echoed on many corporate websites, with companies arguing that they 
are focused on the environment, the community they are based in, or, as in Coca-Cola‟s 
case, every community they touch: “We are a global company with local roots in 
every community where we do business. We are committed to the needs of our 
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communities” (Coca-Cola 2010). Coca-Cola and DuPont are arguing that they are 
committed to assisting, or being “stewards” of, their community through their own 
internal corporate character, something that falls in line with the new moral marketplace 
discussion. If such claims are true, then companies that join voluntary initiatives are 
likely to be better corporate citizens than companies that do not join. Thus, companies 
that join voluntary initiatives should have fewer violations than companies that do not 
join such initiatives. To examine this new moral marketplace, a group of variables related 
to environmental stewardship (EPA violations), along with financial judiciousness (SEC 





 As discussed in the CSR section, there is an argument that corporations do not 
feel morally compelled, pushed by a desire to gain a competitive advantage, or do not 
think about how well they may be able to assist communities they are in; instead, they are 
simply avoiding regulation (Vogel 2008; Bennie, Bernhagen and Mitchell 2007; Murray 
2004; Alberini 2002; Videras and Alberini 2000). Khanna (2007: 754) states that firms 
can “preempt regulation, shape future regulations, gain competitive advantage and market 
share, build corporate reputation with communities and environmental groups, and lower 
the costs of capital by reducing liabilities.” The more visible a company is, and the more 
contact it has with regulatory groups, the more it attempts to make at least symbolic 
changes in company policies. This will be discussed in greater detail in the methods and 
variables section of this work. This “avoidance of future regulation” concept is one of the 
                                                 
4
 Both of these variables will be explained in full detail in the methods and analysis section of this work. 
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main drivers of the extensive greenwashing debate. 
Three variables in this analysis will examine the regulatory avoidance argument 
for joining the Global Compact: the number of sites that the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) is monitoring per company, the number of violations the EPA has charged 
each company with, and the number of litigation documents filed against each company 
by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
5
 If these variables 
(particularly EPA violations and SEC litigation documents) are positively related to 
joining the GC, then this will further bolster the regulation avoidance concept, with 
companies acting to mitigate their violations through other positive means. Companies 
with low violation totals might not be as concerned about signing into the GC since they 
are either familiar with or abiding by the regulation process, whereas those companies 
already in trouble with regulators (those with high violation totals) would be more likely 
to sign into the GC. If this is true, then it is expected that companies that have signed the 
GC will have more violations than those that have not signed. These measures will be 
detailed later in this work, but they are all part of the analysis looking to see whether 
companies that are “good” or “bad” actors are more prone to join the Global Compact. 
Types of Voluntary Initiatives 
 Voluntary initiatives come in a multitude of forms ranging from specific internal 
codes of conduct to sweeping environmental regulations. According to Alberini and 
Segerson (2002), there are three types of voluntary initiatives: unilateral (involving only 
one company), bilateral (involving more than one company, deemed multilateral 
throughout this section), and government-based. Bilateral and multilateral agreements 
                                                 
5
 These variables can be argued to be part of the “moral marketplace” standpoint, or the “regulatory 
avoidance” standpoint, which is discussed in detail later in this work. 
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have a similar framework (involving multiple companies, bilateral specifically referring 
to only two) and are collapsed into one category for illustrative purposes. 
Unilateral initiatives are those undertaken by a single organization, a policy 
change, or new sustainable manufacturing guidelines. Abatement actions are initiated by 
the polluters, and regulators do not play a role in the enforcement (Alberini and Segerson 
2002: 158). Unilateral programs can be fairly loose and flexible since there is only one 
company involved in the process, and changes can be made whenever the organization 
feels compelled to do so. 
 Multilateral initiatives can extend to a just a handful of organizations or thousands 
of companies, depending on these initiatives‟ breadth and intent. Agreement terms are 
often “determined by negotiation between the regulator and the [violator],” which at 
times involves a neutral organization doing the “regulating” (Alberini and Segerson 2002: 
158). The violator generally agrees to certain pollution abatement activities, and the 
regulator agrees not to take enforcement-type actions against the polluter, commits to 
providing technical or financial assistance, or agrees to grant permits or approve other 
activities if certain steps are taken (2002: 158). Multilateral initiatives are becoming more 
popular and utilized given that there is an information sharing process involved; they are 
generally more recognizable and respected than unilateral programs, and the companies 
themselves do not have to set up or oversee the process. Companies can sign up for these 
programs, or they can be directed at entire industries, depending on the intentions of the 
organizations involved. The UN Global Compact is one of these initiatives, which will be 





Lastly, government-based initiatives are contracts or regulations set up by one or 
multiple government agencies and then followed by the group(s) of companies that are 
under the governments‟ its influential umbrella. In this approach, both groups set up the 
parameters of the initiative, or the government agency can decide what it entails, and then 
it is decided how the companies are punished or rewarded (Alberini and Segerson 2002: 
158). These, too, can range from simple to complex, often involving evaluation measures 
taken up by a range of federal programs and offices. The EPA, for example, has 
established systems to help limit the amount of pollutants companies can emit without 
being penalized. One example was the 33/50 program (designed to reduce regulated 
chemical emissions by 33% by 1992 and 50% by 1995 based on their 1988 volumes) and 
their Audit Policy, set up to encourage companies to report violations and, in return for 
doing so, have some penalty leeway (Stretesky and Gabriel 2005). Companies can be 
hesitant to sign up for these programs since they are monitored by governmental agencies 
or departments, and violations by an organization can concurrently be detected, penalized, 
and made public, depending on the severity of the incident. 
While the types of voluntary initiatives, and the reasons for joining them, are the 
larger foundation on which this work is built, the focus of this work will be a particular 
voluntary initiative, the Global Compact. The GC is an example of initiative based on 
principles set up to foster CSR among corporations, governmental agencies, universities, 
and other public groups. It involves companies from around the world that signed into a 
shared agreement to adhere to principles set up and monitored by the United Nations. A 






Chapter IV. THE GLOBAL COMPACT 
The Beginning 
 From 1997-2001 John Ruggie served as United Nations Assistant Secretary-
General for Strategic Planning – a post created specifically for him by then Secretary-
General Kofi Annan – where he was responsible for establishing and overseeing the UN 
Global Compact, now the world‟s largest corporate citizenship initiative (Ruggie 2009). 
Ruggie is currently a professor of International Affairs and the Director of the Center for 
Business and Government at the Kennedy School of Government and an Affiliated 
Professor in International Legal Studies at Harvard Law School (Ruggie 2009). In 2005, 
responding to a request by the UN Commission on Human Rights (now the Human 
Rights Council), Annan appointed Ruggie as the Secretary-General‟s Special 
Representative for Business and Human Rights, a post he continues to hold in the new 
UN administration under Ban Ki-Moon (Ruggie 2009). His influence over the operations 
of the GC and the communication of its principles is still extensive today (Vogel 2008). 
In January of 1999, Kofi Annan announced the birth of the GC at the World 
Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland and set the tone for the Compact going forward, 
stating the “goals of United Nations and those of business can, indeed, be mutually 
supportive” (Annan 1999: 1). Annan wanted to take the relationship between businesses 
and the UN to a new level via the Global Compact, proposing that UN and business 
leaders “initiate a global compact of shared values and principles” (Annan 1999: 1). The 
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growth of transnational corporations spurred Ruggie and Annan to link the UN to the 
corporate world by developing a guide for companies to follow while engaged in 
corporate social responsibility. Annan (1999) stated: 
 Globalization is a fact of life. But I believe we have underestimated its fragility. The 
problem is this, the spread of the market outpaces the ability of societies and their 
political systems to adjust to them, let alone guide the course they take. History 
teaches us that such an imbalance between the economic, social, and political realms 
can never be sustained for long. (1) 
Annan wanted to make sure that businesses take into consideration the actions they are 
engaged in, and given their extensive reach, were affecting billions of people. The Global 
Compact was created using the frameworks of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the International Labor Organization‟s Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work, the Rio Declaration of Environment and Development, and the 
United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UN Global Compact 2009a; Bennie 
2007; Annan 1999). Ruggie wrote that “business has created a single global economic 
space; but we lack the adequate social or political means to govern that space;” This 
“lacking means” was the main push behind creating the GC (Ruggie 2004: 1). Annan 
(1999: 4) continues, “National markets are held together by shared values,” but in an 
international market those values differ greatly between companies operating in opposite 
corners of the world. Society needs to choose “between a selfish free-for-all in which we 
ignore the fate of the losers, and a future in which the strong and successful accept their 
responsibilities, showing global vision and leadership” (Annan 1999: 4). The GC, he 





What is the GC? 
 The UN Global Compact is a multilateral agreement for businesses, NGOs, 
academic institutions, and governmental agencies to engage with each other in a 
conversation of responsible action.
6
 The GC is composed of a set of principles that 
companies agree to abide by in all of their business practices. These fall under four 
headings: Human Rights, Labor, Environment, and Anti-Corruption. The principles are 
the foundation of the GC and can be found throughout its literature and are reproduced 
here as they are seen in the “UN Global Compact Annual Review: 2008 Leaders Summit” 
manual: 
Human Rights 
 Principle 1: Businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally 
proclaimed human rights; and 
 Principle 2: make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses. 
Labor 
 Principle 3: Businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the effective 
recognition of the right to collective bargaining; 
 Principle 4: The elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labor; 
 Principle 5: The effective abolition of child labor; and 
 Principle 6: The elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and 
occupation 
Environment 




                                                 
6
 The concept multilateral agreement is referred to as a pact, or understanding, between a variety of 
individuals or entities who share the same goal or values. 
7
 “Precautionary approach” refers to companies attempting to have a limited impact on the environment(s) 
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 Principle 8: Undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility; 
and 
 Principle 9: Encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly 
technologies. 
Anti-Corruption 
 Principle 10: Business should work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion 
and bribery. 
 
These principles were chosen because they “are values people all over the world will 
recognize as their own” (Annan 1999: 2). The principles attempt to cover all of the 
pressing social issues that companies come across in their daily workings and promote 
fair treatment of communities they interact with, the individuals within the corporations, 
and the environment. However, the Global Compact is not a legally binding agreement. It 
is, as Annan (1999: 3) claims, a genuine compact “because neither side of it can succeed 
without the other.” Without the active engagement of corporations the principles will 
amount to nothing but meaningless words and the Compact itself will be something “we 
can celebrate and make speeches about, but with limited impact on the lives of ordinary 
people” (Annan 1999: 3). The GC is intended to alter the direction that organizations are 
headed, helping them embrace the ideas of social responsibility and providing guidance 
along the way. 
Joining, and Remaining Engaged in, the Global Compact 
The process companies go through to join the Global Compact differs from that of 
other groups (universities, NGOs, etc.); this work only covers the company related 
process. There are two main steps that companies need to take in order to become a part 
                                                                                                                                                 
they are based in, or will be targeting for future expansion. 
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of the GC. First, the company must prepare and submit a “Letter of Commitment from 
the Chief Executive Officer (endorsed by the Board of Directors) to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations expressing support for the Global Compact and its 
principles,” along with completing an online “Organization Registration Form” (UN 
Global Compact 2009a). Once a company has submitted the Letter of Commitment they 
are, as stated on the Compact‟s website, expected to: 
 Make the Global Compact and its principles an integral part of business strategy, 
day-to-day operations, and organizational culture; 
 Incorporate the Global Compact and its principles in the decision-making 
processes of the highest-level governance body (i.e., the Board of Directors); 
 Contribute to broad development objectives through partnerships; 
 Integrate in its annual report (or in a similar public document, such as a 
sustainability report) a description of the ways in which it implements the 
principles and supports broader development objectives (also known as the 
Communication on Progress); and 
 Advance the Global Compact and the case for responsible business practices 
through advocacy and active outreach to peers, partners, clients, consumers and 
the public at large. (UN Global Compact 2009a)  
Since the majority of these expectations are not based on measurable actions, but rather 
changes in attitudes and furthering the Compact‟s mission, the main portion that the 
companies have to abide by is the Communication of Progress (COP) report. The UN 
claims the COP report is part of the learning process of the Compact, and is the only way 
that organizations can maintain their membership. As the Compact‟s website claims “the 
annual posting of a COP is an important demonstration of a participant's commitment to 
the UN Global Compact and its principles” (UN Global Compact 2009a).  If companies 
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failed to submit a COP each year they were, up until January of 2010, put in a 
probationary participant status and after two years without a COP they were delisted; 
current policy demands that companies are delisted after one year of noncompliance (UN 
Global Compact 2009a). From the start of the Compact through 2007 there had only been 
396 companies delisted, though since January of 2008 more than 1,400 organizations 
have been delisted, 859 of those happening between October 1, 2009 and January 1, 2010 
(UN Global Compact 2009b; United Nations Global Compact Annual Review 2008). If a 
company is delisted and wants to participate again they can rejoin the Compact by 
sending in a new Letter of Commitment and then must continue to submit yearly COPs to 
stay active. 
To help with the financial burden of maintaining the Compact‟s office, along with 
organizing the various forums, meetings, and learning programs that members of the GC 
can take part in, participating companies are asked to make annual financial contribution 




 For companies with annual sales/revenues of $1 billion, the suggested annual 
contribution is $10,000; 
 For companies with annual sales/revenues between $250 million and $1 billion, 
the suggested annual contribution is $5000; 
 For companies with annual sales/revenues of less than $250 million, the suggested 
annual contribution is $500. (UN Global Compact 2009a) 
These are only suggested donation amounts, companies can give more or less as they 
prefer. Once companies have signed into the GC they can find support through “Local 
                                                 
8
 Value are in U.S. dollars. 
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Networks” (UN Global Compact 2009). As of early 2010 there are 80-plus Local 
Networks that have been established and maintained in different regions around the world. 
These networks are often where companies turn to when looking for guidance, and these 
networks provide “opportunities for participants to improve [their] understanding and 
share experiences of the Ten Principles and partnerships, as well as how to report on 
progress in these areas” (United Nations Global Compact Annual Review 2008). More 
than sixty percent of companies signed into the GC belong to Local Networks, which 
increases their exposure to, and understanding of, the Compact and its goals (UN 2008). 
GC Membership Profile 
 As of December 1, 2009, 7,147 companies signed the GC; 5,203 of which were 
businesses and 1,944 of them were government oriented, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), schools, foundations, and other public and private groups and organizations (UN 
Global Compact 2009a). Participants hail from 135 countries and nearly half (47.7%) are 
based in Europe. There are 345 participants based in the United States (only 4.9% of the 
total participants), and 229 of those participants are companies of varying sizes. This lack 
of U.S. participation can be partially explained by the fact that the vast majority of the 
time the GC has been functioning the United States government, then lead by George W. 
Bush, has taken steps to distance itself from the United Nations (Bennie et al. 2007: 740), 
but this is only partially to blame for the low numbers. Despite the fact that many 
researchers acknowledge that most US companies do not actively engage in the GC, few 
studies have examined this issue. Thus, determining what factors may predict U.S. 
company membership in the Global Compact may provide some important empirical 
evidence that indicates why U.S. participation rates are low. As previously noted, this 
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study explores differences between those U.S. companies who have joined the GC and 
those U.S. companies that have failed to join the GC. Extant research on participation in 
voluntary initiatives is examined to help identify the best predictors of GC participation. 



















Chapter V. METHODS AND VARIABLES 
Sample 
The companies used in this analysis are all headquartered in the United States. 
This is for a number of reasons: (1) since there is an increasing amount of pressure within 
the U.S. for companies to show some indication of being socially responsible, (2) the 
researcher‟s personal interest in the actions of U.S. corporations, and (3) the availability 
of detailed corporate information (Whitehouse 2006; Warhurst 2006). To determine 
which companies signed into the Global Compact, the United Nations GC website 
(www.unglobalcompact.org) was used to compile a list of all participants that are based 
in the United States. The UN website allows visitors to narrow down search preference to 
region (Asia, Europe, etc.), country, all participants vs. business participants, and the 
dates that the different organizations officially signed the GC. Upon selecting the United 
States and “all participants,” it showed that there were 283 signees of the GC based in the 
United States.
9
 To eliminate NGOs, municipalities, or universities from the list, the 
search parameter was changed to “Business Participants Only,” and 187 large companies 
and SMEs (small and medium enterprises) were reported as being participants.
10
 This 
was further narrowed down to searching solely for “Companies” (excluding the SMEs 
due to inability to access necessary information), and 73 companies that had signed the 
                                                 
9
 This count was at the time of initial selection, which was in February of 2009. As stated previously, the 
numbers have increased to 345 total participants as of July 1, 2009. 
10
 As of July 1, 2009, there are now 229 business participants in the U.S. 
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GC in the Unites States were found. 
To get detailed information needed for analysis, the Dun and Bradstreet “Million 
Dollar Database,” a database comprised of U.S. and Canadian business records, was used 
to obtain corporate data for both the GC signees and a comparison group (Dun & 
Bradstreet 2009). The Million Dollar Database compiles information on companies such 
as total sales amounts, employee totals, the year the company was established, and 
whether or not they are manufacturing-based, all of which are variables in the analysis. 
All but seven of the 73 GC signees were accessible through the Million Dollar Database. 
For those companies not listed in the Million Dollar Database, a similar site, Reference 
USA (www.referenceusa.com), a separate database comprised of 14 million U.S. company 
records, was used to compile the additional data (Reference USA 2009).
11
 Once the 
information for the GC signees was collected (n=70), then a simple random sample of 70 
companies was taken from all 235,451 companies listed in the Million Dollar Database in 
order to have a comparison group. A list of both groups of companies and their values for 
the following variables can be found in Appendix 1 (signees) and Appendix 2 (non-
signees). 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in this work is whether or not a company has joined the 
GC. After putting all of the data into Stata, the variable [gc] was created with “0” 
indicating that a company did not sign the GC and “1” indicating that it did sign the GC. 
As mentioned previously, there are 70 companies in the database that have signed the GC 
                                                 
11
 There were three companies that were not accessible through either database: Global Alumina, SelectNY, 
and Trimtab Management Solutions. Two of the companies, Global Alumina (Canada) and SelectNY 
(Berlin, Germany) are not based in the U.S., while Trimtab Management Solutions is too small an 
enterprise to show up in either database; therefore, these three were excluded from this analysis.  
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and 70 companies that have not signed the GC. This variable was the basis for all 
comparisons made throughout this work. 
Independent Variables 
Several independent variables were created based on the existing voluntary 
initiatives literature reviewed in Chapter III and supported by data collected through the 
Dun and Bradstreet Million Dollar Database, Reference USA, the EPA Environmental 
Compliance History Online database, and the SEC Edgar database. There are three 
general categories for the independent variables (competitive advantage, new moral 
marketplace, and regulatory avoidance) with several measures falling under each; 
information about the broader categories and the specifics of each variable are detailed 
below. 
Competitive Advantage 
Competitive advantage in this work is measured through the assets that companies 
are able to use to gain influence in the industry they are a part of. Previous research 
(Amato and Amato 2007; Bennie et al. 2007) has argued that the size of a company is 
influential when competing against other firms, specifically stating that larger firms (i.e., 
those with more resources available to them) are better equipped to sign into voluntary 
initiatives. As noted in the discussion in Chapter III, company size is measured by 
company sales and the number of employees. 
Company Resources 
The amount of resources that companies have is influential when determining 
whether the companies will engage in voluntary initiatives. Large companies are best 
equipped to engage in voluntary initiatives due to the vast resources they have at their 
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disposal. Royal Dutch Shell, Exxon Mobile, and Wal-Mart currently hold the top three 
spots in sales numbers according to the 2009 Forbes Global 2000 list; each has sales 
greater than $400 billion in 2008, numbers similar to those of many small nations 
(Central Intelligence Agency 2009). Useem (1998) argues that highly profitable 
corporations are more likely to become involved in CSR due to their ability to use funds 
for those purposes. Bennie et al. (2007) also argue that getting involved in voluntary 
initiatives is a costly endeavor, which is why it is more commonly seen among 
corporations with large sales volumes. Alberini (2002: 165) supports this argument with 
his claim that larger companies are more likely to join because they have more economic 
resources or “lower marginal costs of abatement.” They are able to use smaller portions 
of their economic resources to implement corporate giving campaigns. Useem (1998: 78) 
points out that the nation‟s top one tenth of one percent of corporations account for more 
than half of the corporate giving in the U.S., and that “virtually all large corporations with 
sales over $500 million do,” further bolstering this position. Furthering the argument that 
company resources influence a company‟s willingness to sign the GC, both Fussler (2004) 
and Besser and Miller (2001) state that the number of employees influences whether or 
not a company will join an initiative. These previous works all argue that companies with 
greater resources are more likely to sign into voluntary initiatives; therefore, there should 
be a positive relationship between company size and the GC membership. 
Bennie et al. (2007) specifically looked at whether there was a relationship 
between company size and Global Compact participation and found that as the size of a 
company increases, so does their chance of involvement. They looked at the Forbes 
Global 2000 list, measured by sales numbers, and noted that of the top 1,000 companies, 
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15% were involved in the GC, while only 4% of the next 1,000 companies were 
signatories (Bennie et al. 2007: 743). Their analysis is the only to date looking 
specifically at the GC, and it further illustrates the positive relationship between company 
size and voluntary initiative engagement. 
Amato and Amato (2007) have mixed results, supporting, on the one hand, the 
argument that larger companies are more likely to become involved in voluntary 
initiatives and, on the other hand, that smaller companies are willing to sign into 
agreements as well. They argue that smaller firms are more likely to be involved in the 
communities they are based in due to the fact that they are generally locally owned and 
operated, and thus are more connected to and concerned about the communities they are 
based in. Their findings indicate a U-shaped giving profile in relation to company size 
since both large and small companies were likely to be involved in voluntary initiatives, 
whereas medium-sized companies were less likely to be involved. 
 Large companies are able to spend more money on CSR campaigns, to both 
bolster their image and find new niches in markets where they can creatively promote 
their name, and they gain an advantage over other companies in their field for doing so. 
Smaller companies are connected to the individuals and organizations in their immediate 
surroundings, which increases their likelihood of signing. Both of these claims will be 
tested using measures related to company resources. 
To examine how company size is related to those companies that have and have 
not signed into the Global Compact, there are several variables included in this analysis. 
The variable company size, [size], was created using data from both the Dun and 
Bradstreet database and Reference USA. This variable was created by combining the 
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number of employees with the sales volumes of each company in the analysis, with a 
weighting scheme to ensure equal influence for both factors.
12
 The raw totals of the 
number of employees per company and company sales were also added to the analysis, 
with the variable [employees] representing the number of employees that operate directly 
under the name of the company included in this work (out of 140 companies, data was 
available for 134 of them for this variable).
13
 The variable [salesm] was created to mark 
the number of gross U.S. dollars that a company earned during the 2007-2008 fiscal 
year.
14
 Both [employees] and [salesm] were squared to test the theoretical U-shaped 




Regulatory Avoidance or New Moral Marketplace? 
Hess et al. (2002) argued that one of the reasons that companies decide to sign 
into voluntary initiatives is based on their desire to be ethical companies, meaning they 
are at least partially driven by the increasing pressures to abide by the latent rules of the 
new moral marketplace. Companies feel compelled to alter their business practices for 
the sake of being “good,” and if that is the case, there should be negative relationship 
between measures related to compliance or regulation and the GC membership. There is 
also an established argument that companies are not changing their practices due to 
recalibrated moral compasses, but instead they are altering their business practices to 
                                                 
12
 The number of employees and the sales volumes for each company were averaged, and then each 
company‟s respective totals (in each category) were divided by the average. These scaled numbers, one for 
sales and another for employees, were then added to one another to create the number indicated by the 
variable [size]. This ensured that both sets of values (sales totals and employee totals) were similar to one 
another, and subsequently counted for equal proportions of the new variable [size]. 
13
 This variable was squared to test Amato and Amato‟s (2007) assertion that large and small companies 
were more likely to join voluntary initiatives than medium-sized companies were, or that a U-shaped giving 
profile is to be expected. To further test this, [salesm] was also squared. 
14
 Sales are reported in millions. 
15
 Employees-squared is reported in thousands; sales-squared is reported in billions. 
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avoid future regulations being imposed (Vogel 2008; Bennie et al. 2007, Murray 2004; 
Alberini 2002; Videras and Alberini 2000). If this “avoidance” argument is true, then 
there should be a positive relationship between measures related to compliance or 
regulation and the GC, therefore rejecting the idea of companies having new moral 
compasses. The concepts of the new moral marketplace and regulatory avoidance seem 
contradictory in nature. Companies either join to do the right thing or do so to avoid 
regulation. The variables that examine compliance and regulatory pressure should help 
determine which explanation is more plausible for U.S. companies that join the GC.  
Regulatory Avoidance: SEC Pressure 
As described earlier, companies often engage in voluntary initiatives to avoid 
potential regulation from actors outside their industry, or possible limitations and red tape 
blocking their corporate actions. Patrick Maclagan (2008: 373) states that companies 
often engage in socially responsible actions because they are trying to correct “systemic 
deficiencies” or because they are patching up violations that have been noticed by state 
regulators or NGOs. Videras (2000: 450) continues this argument by stating that a 
“stronger threat of regulation is expected to induce firms to self-regulate,” an argument 
echoed by several authors (Vogel 2008; Bennie 2007; Khanna 2007; Murray 2004; 
Alberini 2002). Companies want to avoid any additional measures put into place that 
could restrict their movement and procedures; thus, they attempt to show they are self-
enlightened by claiming to have both discovered and solved the problems that they are 
creating. More regulatory pressure, or perceived increased regulation, leads firms to react 
with an increased propensity to join voluntary initiatives (Alberini 2002: 169). 
“Governments can create tax incentives or disincentives, erect barriers to market entry, 
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set legal minimum wages and place regulatory conditions of a business” (Bennie et al. 
2007: 735), and this pressure of being able to stifle or enhance the environments that 
corporations subsist in influences their willingness to participate in CSR initiatives. 
The United States Securities and Exchange Commission‟s EDGAR database was 
used to look at one form of governmental pressure being placed on the firms in the 
analysis. Within the SEC, search parameters “enforcement” and “litigation” documents 
within a ten-year period (from June 1, 1999 to May 31, 2009) were used to determine one 
aspect of regulatory pressure that the sample companies have felt within the last decade 
(U.S. SEC 2009b). This form of regulatory pressure was used to see if there is a trend 
among companies that have had negative connections to the SEC (measured through the 
“enforcement” and “litigation” documentation filed) and their willingness to join a well-
known voluntary initiative to help bolster their company‟s profile, something that is 
common among businesses in this scenario (Whitehouse 2006: Arthaud-Day 2005; 
Whitehouse 2003; Videras and Alberini 2000). Ten-year period was used as a reference 
timeframe due to the fact that the GC itself has been going for roughly that period, and 
none of the companies in the analysis had signed into the compact prior to the cut-off 
date. The number of documents that appeared in the SEC database indicates separate 
litigation filings for each company, not simply echoes of previous filings. The variable 
[seclit] is used to indicate the number of documents appearing under each company‟s 
name during the chosen timeframe for this analysis. 
Regulatory Avoidance: EPA Pressure 
Alberini (2002: 164) found that poor environmental performance in the past has 
been an indicator as to whether firms participate in new voluntary initiatives. Firms that 
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have had the spotlight on them for violations try to change their profile by starting up, or 
joining, new initiatives to help better their environmental track record and image. Even 
“improvements in energy efficiency lead to reductions in use that both save costs and 
reduce emissions,” which saves companies money and improves their environmental 
standing (Alberini 2002: 162). If an entire industry is targeted, generally, only a few 
companies actually change their procedures, and the others benefit from a “free-rider 
incentive” or claim that they have made changes only to do little as needed to sneak by. 
Konar and Cohen (1997) argue that an increase in voluntary initiatives occurs because 
poor environmental performance can lead to decreased stock prices. They found that 
when companies were penalized for violations, they often saw their financial statements 
negatively affected by the news in ensuing company reports. There is also the general 
argument that some companies only claim to change their ways, or greenwash, their 
image only to behave in similar manners. Looking at the environmental regulations that 
each company is involved in is another way, much like the [seclit] variable, to see 
whether companies are reacting to pressure and changing their actions to “avoid 
regulation,” illustrated previously in the “Voluntary Initiatives” chapter. 
The EPA‟s ECHO database details the number of facilities that are being 
monitored for each company and has totals of inspections within the last five years, 
quarters in non-compliance, alleged current significant violations, informal enforcement 
actions, and formal enforcement actions (Environmental Protection Agency 2009). The 
variable [epaviol] indicates the number of formal violations levied against each company 
within the maximum timeframe available (five years) and was added to the analysis. 
Since the number of sites that a company has can affect the number of total violations 
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that are levied against a company, the variable [epasites] is used to determine the number 
of sites that each company currently has monitored by the EPA. These are both just 
numerical reflections of the number of sites and violations for each company in the 
analysis; coupled with [seclit] totals, these will help illustrate the compliance-related side 
of the CSR debate detailed earlier. 
If regulatory avoidance is a motivating factor for joining the GC, then there 
should be a positive relationship between SEC litigation document totals [seclit], EPA 
violation totals [epaviol], and the number of potential locations for violations handed 
down by the EPA [epasites]. A positive relationship between the GC membership and 
these variables would indicate that companies that are frequently being sanctioned for 
violations are attempting to prove to regulators their willingness to correct wrongdoings, 
with underlying intentions of warding off any additional laws or regulations. 
New Moral Marketplace 
The argument from the regulatory avoidance also applies to the concept of the 
new moral marketplace, albeit in an inverse fashion. Companies that are fueled by the 
new moral marketplace perspective are not simply reacting to pressures from regulators, 
but instead they are intrinsically motivated to comply with regulations and should be 
actively pursuing ways to minimize their environmental violations and financial 
transgressions. Hess et al. (2002) argues that companies that fall into the new moral 
marketplace category are not simply altering their practices for the sake of conforming to 
new rules, but they are doing so because they are trying to abide by the new moral 
guidelines that firms feel they are connected to. As mentioned previously, statements 
expressing this way of thinking can be found on many corporate websites that make 
49 
 
claims that they have high “ethical standards” (DuPont 2010) or are “committed to honest 
and ethical behavior” (Exxon Mobile 2010). If such claims are true, then companies that 
join voluntary initiatives are likely to be better corporate citizens than companies that do 
not join. Thus, companies that join voluntary initiatives should have fewer violations than 
companies that do not join voluntary initiatives. To support the new moral marketplace 
argument, lower numbers of the aforementioned variables – [seclit], [epaviol], and 
[epasites] – should be found amongst the GC signees; put otherwise, there should be a 
negative relationship between these regulatory measures and the GC membership.  
It can be argued that by finding a positive association with violations (pointing to 
regulatory avoidance) or a negative association (suggesting a “new moral marketplace”), 
the underlying influence can be unveiled. This work attempts to test these two 
suppositions regarding motivations that drive companies toward involvement in 
voluntary regulations.  
Control Variables 
It is important to adjust for additional control variables that might be important 
predictors of financial violations, environmental violations, company size, and the GC 
membership. Failure to control for important predictors could introduce specification 
error into the model and positively or negatively bias coefficients of variables of interest. 
For this reason, two additional controls are included in the analysis that measure 
company age and the degree to which a company is engaged in manufacturing. 
Industry Influences 
 The level of contact a company has with the public is argued to be an indicator of 
their willingness to participate in CSR initiatives (Useem 1998). Service-industry-based 
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firms (those in banking, retail, healthcare, etc.) are more likely to participate in voluntary 
initiatives, since their customers are more likely to evaluate their contributions to society, 
than those in other industries (Useem 1998: 83). Fussler (2004) adds to this, arguing that 
there are industry-specific initiatives meant to change the public‟s perception, which in 
turn is used as a marketing strategy for those companies. Regulations are often industry-
based, meaning that within-industry organizations should show similar responsiveness to 
voluntary initiatives (Vogel 2008: 269). Bennie et al. (2007) argue that companies with 
highly visible public profiles are more likely to join voluntary initiatives so that they can 
more easily deflect criticisms of their business practices and maintain a positive image to 
maintain large customer bases. Manufacturing companies often operate outside the public 
spotlight since they do not have immediate contact with the public but instead produce 
products, or machinery used to create products, for other companies to sell or use. On the 
other hand, manufacturing companies have larger footprints in society, and increased 
reliance on, and foundations in, the environment, which could point toward their 
willingness to join the GC. They could also be looking to avoid increased regulations, 
much like the EPA and SEC violators mentioned earlier. 
Given that companies within the same industry, according to the literature, are 
likely to both be influenced by similar amounts of pressure and to follow one another in 
terms of their regulatory and compliance initiatives, a broad-based within-industry 
measure is included in the analysis. Whether the company is primarily based in 
manufacturing is indicated as [manufact] and is coded with “0” (no), indicating that the 
company is not primarily based in manufacturing, and “1” (yes), indicating it is primarily 
based in manufacturing, to determine whether differences exist between the two groups 
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and their participation rates in the GC. The relationship between manufacturing and the 
GC membership should be negative. 
Company Duration 
 One additional control variable is the date that the company was established. This 
variable can be said to be influenced by the previous argument of companies needing to 
maintain their positive profile or increase their reputation (especially for young, 
upcoming businesses not well known to the public). Thus, the relationship between year 
of establishing and joining the GC should be positive. This variable is also included due 
to a lack of previous research focusing on company duration; thus, this work is an 
exploratory extension of previous work. The variable [estab] is included and represents 
the year that the company was established. All variable names, their scopes, sources, and 




Table 1. Variable List and Description 
Variable Name Variable Indicator/Measurement Source of Data Variable Indication 
salesm The sales totals for the 2007-2008 fiscal year 
for each company 
Dun & Bradstreet Million Dollar Database / 
Reference USA Business Database 
 
Competitive Advantage 
sales2b [salesm] squared (in billions) Dun & Bradstreet Million Dollar Database / 
Reference USA Business Database 
 
Competitive Advantage 
employees The number of employees per company Dun & Bradstreet Million Dollar Database / 
Reference USA Business Database 
 
Competitive Advantage 
employees2t [employees] squared (in thousands) Dun & Bradstreet Million Dollar Database / 
Reference USA Business Database 
 
Competitive Advantage 
size A 50/50 weighted combination of [salesm] 
and [employees] 
Dun & Bradstreet Million Dollar Database / 
Reference USA Business Database 
 
Competitive Advantage 
seclit The number of litigation documents filed 
against each company by the SEC 
Securities and Exchange Commission EDGAR 
Database 
 
Regulatory Avoidance or New Moral 
Marketplace 
epasites Number of company sites that the EPA is 
currently monitoring 
Environmental Protection Agency Enforcement 
and Compliance History Online Database 
 
Regulatory Avoidance or New Moral 
Marketplace 
epaviol Number of EPA violations that have been 
filed against each company over the past five 
years 
Environmental Protection Agency Enforcement 
and Compliance History Online Database 
 
Regulatory Avoidance or New Moral 
Marketplace 
manufact Whether or not the company is primarily 
involved in manufacturing 
Dun & Bradstreet Million Dollar Database / 
Reference USA Business Database 
 
Control Variable 
estab Year the company was established Dun & Bradstreet Million Dollar Database / 







Chapter VI. ANALYSIS 
 Using the data analysis software Stata, Version 10, the initial step of the analysis 
is to calculate the means, medians, and standard deviations of each variable, first for 
every company and then for the groups split into the GC signees and non-signees. T-tests 
(or z-tests) based on either mean comparisons or proportion comparisons are used to test 
whether these variables differ between the two groups in the analysis, while the 
multivariate analysis is conducted using logistic regression. 
As stated previously, the variable [gc], indicating whether a company has signed 
into the Global Compact, is the dependent variable. Following the discussion above, the 
independent variables are: the company sales totals during the 2008 fiscal year (in 
millions) [salesm], the number of employees per company [employees], the number of 
violation documents that show up under each company within the SEC database within 
the past ten years [seclit], the number of company sites the EPA monitors per company 
[epasites], the number of violations each company has had [epaviol] in the past ten years, 
whether or not the company is based in manufacturing [manufact], and the year the 
company was established [estab]. Results of both the mean and proportion testing (Tables 






Table 2. Mean, Median, and Standard Deviation Values for Each Variable; Totals 
and Sorted by GC Signees and GC Non-Signees. 
   All Companies GC Signees Non-Signees 
 mean median std. dev. Mean median Std. dev. mean median std. dev. 
salesm 12722.7 500.27 29626.18 21463.56 6174.43 36616.03 4361.89 28.1 17405.04 
employees 31411 3000 65832 49085 18800 72100 14001 400 54110 
seclit 3.06 0 7.25 6.01 2 9.38 0.11 0 .401 
epasites 23.53 3 68.11 34.14 5 90.66 12.91 2 29.95 
epaviol 5.07 0 16.50 6.68 0 22.11 3.49 0 7.6 
manufact 0.396 0 0.491 0.565 1 0.499 0.229 0 0.423 
estab 1964 1980 40.27 1954.07 1971 46.84 1974.39 1984 28.93 
 
 
Table 3. Comparing Means and Proportions of GC Signees versus Non-Signees. 
 
  T std. error 
salesm 3.441*** 2549.815 
employees 3.170*** 5708.362 
seclit 5.257*** 0.613 
epasites 1.860 5.756 
epaviol 1.144 1.399 
manufact 4.05†***   
estab -3.012** 3.44 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 




 The variables that are used to test competitive advantage are related to the size of 
the company being evaluated, with larger companies hypothesized to be more likely to 
sign into the GC given their greater amount of resources; [salesm] and [employees] are 





For the variable [salesm], the overall mean is $12,722.70; when split by [gc], the 
signees‟ mean is $21,463.56 million compared with the mean of $4,361.89 million for 
non-signees, a 492% decrease. A two-sample t-test with unequal variances is used to 
determine whether the difference between the mean of the GC signees compared with 
that of non-signees is statistically significant.
16
 A t-value of 3.441 (p<0.001) indicates the 
differences between the two groups are statistically significant based on an alpha level of 
0.05.
17
 Previous literature suggests companies that are more likely to sign into voluntary 
initiatives generally have more resources at their disposal, which is seen here, but there 
are no predictors to explain the broader range of values among the GC signees (the 
greater standard deviation value), though that seems to be inflated by outliers in the 
distribution. 
The number of employees that each company has working for them [employees] 
has an overall mean of 31,411 employees per company; for the GC signees, the mean is 
49,085 employees, while for non-signees, the mean is only 14,001 employees (a 351% 
decrease from the mean of the GC signees).
18
 A two-sample t-test produced a t-value of 
3.170 (p<0.001), again indicating statistical significance. In addition, the large 
discrepancy between the medians of signees versus non-signees (18,800 compared with 
400) seems to support the literature in that larger companies are more prone to getting 
involved in voluntary initiatives of CSR; this possible relationship is examined further in 
                                                 
16
 All t-tests and z-tests used throughout this analysis took into consideration sample sizes, including 
missing values from the populations. Every t-test had unequal variances, so it is only noted once. 
17
 Alpha level of 0.05 was used throughout, unless noted otherwise. 
18





the regression analysis later in this chapter.  
Regulatory Avoidance or New Moral Marketplace? 
 To test the competing concepts of regulatory avoidance and the new moral 
marketplace, three variables are examined, one of which focuses on regulatory pressure 
from the United States Securities and Exchange Commission [seclit], while the other two 
([epasites] and [epaviol]) are based on information from the Environmental Protection 
Agency. All three are defined below, along with brief discussions of their relevance to 
this work. 
The variable [seclit] is based on the number of individual litigation documents 
that have been filed against each company during a ten-year period by the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission. The overall sample mean for [seclit] is 3.06; for 
the GC signees it is 6.01, and for non-signees it is 0.11. The median values are 0 both for 
the overall sample and for non-signees and 2 for the GC signees. The resulting t-test 
(t=5.257; p<0.001) points to a statistical significance between the means of signees and 
non-signees when looking at the variable [seclit]. The GC signees have higher SEC 
litigation numbers than non-signees do in all measures, which mirrors the argument that 
companies feeling more regulatory pressure are more likely sign into voluntary initiatives. 
This finding supports the regulation avoidance argument while simultaneously refuting 
the new moral marketplace, given the higher rates of litigation documents filed against 
the GC signees. 
 To further look at the competing regulatory avoidance and the new moral 




included in the analysis. The mean number of sites that the Environmental Protection 
Agency is currently monitoring [epasites] for the entire sample is 23.53, while it is 34.14 
for the GC signees and only 12.91 for non-signees, through the medians for all three 
groups are similarly low (overall: 3; the GC signees: 5; non-signees: 2). A two-sample t-
test produced a t-value of 1.86 and a p>0.05, indicating these differences are not 
statistically significant. A related measure, the mean EPA violations [epaviol] per 
company, has an overall mean of 5.07; for the GC signees, it is 6.68, and for non-signees, 
it is 3.49. The median value for all three groups (overall, the GC signees, and non-signees) 
is zero. A two-sample t-test indicates that this measure is not statistically significant 
(t=1.144; p>0.05). Neither t-test that examine EPA measures ([epasites] and [epaviol]) 
suggest that companies join to “greenwash” their environmental record or because they 
are good corporate citizens who believe in the new moral marketplace. The regression 
analysis conducted later will show whether this remains true when these variables are 
tested along with the other variables in the analysis. 
Control Variables 
From previous research, it has been suggested that companies that have more 
interaction with the public (thus, manufacturing is not included) are more likely to engage 
in voluntary initiatives than those that do not have as much contact. Research also shows 
that there are similar levels of voluntary initiative participation within industries, and the 
variable [manufact] is intended to test both strands of literature, to different degrees. The 
total sample has an overall proportion mean of 0.396 (or 39.6% of companies are based 




22.9% of non-signees are. This shows that the number of the GC signees based in 
manufacturing is more than double when compared with the number of non-signee 
companies based in manufacturing. In comparing the two proportions (z-value = 4.05; 
p<0.001), the two groups are significantly different. Given the high number of 
manufacturing companies engaged in the GC, this finding goes against the previous 
studies that argue companies based in service-oriented business practices are more likely 
to engage in voluntary initiatives, but it does mirror the previously stated argument that 
companies in manufacturing have larger corporate footprints and are perhaps attempting 
to avoid regulation. This finding could also reflect that manufacturing companies may be 
morally driven to engage in voluntary initiatives, although the intention of this measure is 
not to test for this relationship but instead to control for the type of industry that 
companies operate in. 
 The last variable, the length of time that a company has been in business [estab], 
is examined to see if it influences a company‟s willingness to become involved in CSR 
practices. It can be estimated that companies with established reputations are going to be 
less willing to join voluntary initiative due to their lengthy history with their client base, 
not needing to bolster their image as much as those companies who are newly established 
do. Those long-established companies can also be more prone to attack by regulatory 
groups or NGOs, or both, if they have any history of environmental or compliance non-
compliance, which would lead this analysis to find that older companies may be more 
willing to sign up for voluntary initiatives. These are only two of the possible scenarios 




significant differences between these groups related to company duration. The overall 
mean for [estab] is 1964; for the GC signees, it is 1954, and for non-signees, it is 1974, 
indicating the GC signees are older. The median values for each group are 1980 (overall), 
1971 (the GC signees), and 1984 (non-signees), again pointing to older companies as 
being more involved in the GC. When comparing the means of these two groups, the 
results (t=-3.012; p<0.01) signify the differences between these means is statistically 
significant. Again, these results indicate that companies operating longer are more likely 
to participate in voluntary initiatives, specifically within the GC. This relationship needs 
to be explored in more detail to possibly determine why this relationship exists; to further 
explore this and the other variables in relation to one another, logistic regression analysis 
is used. 
 In sum, the findings related to company size, [salesm] and [employees], seem to 
support the concept of competitive advantage proposed by Hess et al. (2002). The GC 
signees are larger in terms of both total sales and number of employees, which would 
suggest that they are able to utilize their higher totals of resources to sign into voluntary 
initiatives. Measures related to the regulatory avoidance and the new moral marketplace 
dichotomy largely support the former, although the findings were not consistent. 
Companies that have signed the GC have higher totals of SEC litigation documents filed 
against them [seclit], are monitored more by the EPA [epasites], and have had more 
environmental violations [epaviol] than non-signees had, although only the [seclit] 
variable proved to be statistically significant. Lastly, the two control variables measuring 




company has been in operation [estab] indicated that the majority of the GC signees are 
involved in manufacturing and they are older. These two measures will help control for 
differences in the larger corporate environment in addition to the effect of being more 
established, both in the community and in the eyes of regulators. All of these variables 
have been used to establish a baseline argument for or against the proposed indicators of 
voluntary initiative engagement, but it is now important to see if these findings remain 
when multivariate logistic regression is used. 
Multivariate Logistic Regression Analysis 
 The above testing of means and proportions points to some variables as being 
statistically significant when the t- or z-values are compared for each variable split by GC 
membership, [gc], but the findings do not indicate the impact each variable has in 
combination with one another. Using multivariate logistic regression, all of the variables 
are analyzed to see what kind of relationship they have to the Global Compact [gc], with 
three different models calculated using various size measures. The results of these 











Table 4. Multivariate Logistic Regression Results 
  
 Model 1 
Using [salesm] 















salesm 1.0001 2.23*     
sales2b 0.9999 -2.60**     
employees   1.0000 1.71~   
employees2t   0.9999 -0.85   
size     0.9048 -1.42 
seclit 32.2755 27.2203*** 12.6205 3.73*** 23.3438 4.11*** 
epasites 1.0038 .00839 1.0003 0.04 1.0071 0.88 
epaviol 1.0026 0.4149 0.9939 -0.19 0.9853 -0.52 
manufact 3.5678 2.3042* 2.3776 1.38 3.3467 1.92~ 
estab 1.0068 0.0094 1.0041 0.48 1.0064 0.74 
Pseudo R
2 0.5705  0.5482  0.5415  
N 131  129  126  
~ p<.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** <0.001  
 
Competitive Advantage 
In the three different models, the findings associated with size, using the 
previously detailed variables related to size (company sales totals [salesm], total numbers 
of employees [employees], and the variable combining the two [size]), were inconsistent. 
Models 1 and 2 indicate findings consistent with the competitive advantage hypothesis, 
albeit only slightly. The odds ratios for both standard measures of size ([salesm] and 
[employees]) are positive, though only [salesm] is significant at an alpha level of 0.05.
19
 
The squared terms for each measure are negative, with [sales2b] suggesting significance 
at the p<0.01 level, though the odds ratios roughly equal those of the standard measures 
(0.999 compared with 1.000, respectively). These findings seem to support the U-shaped 
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giving that Amato and Amato (2007) argue for, indicating that both small and large 
companies are likely to sign into the GC; specifically, it seems that as companies become 
very large, they are more likely to sign into the GC, which again supports the competitive 
advantage argument. The indicator of size in Model 3 [size], which is a weighted 
combination of employee and sales totals for each company, produced an odds ratio of 
0.9048, though it is not statistically significant. This third model indicates that as 
companies increase in size (measured through both employee and sales totals), they are 
less likely to sign into voluntary initiatives, which goes against the findings from Models 
1 and 2. These inconsistent findings do not show significant support for the competitive 
advantage argument that Hess et al. (2002) presents; however, there is some support in 
the first two models for both small and large companies being equally engaged in 
voluntary initiatives. Perhaps, small companies utilize voluntary initiatives to increase 
their connections in a community (either physical or economic), and those connections 
help them compete with the larger organizations in their industry. Large companies, on 
the other hand, are able to assign smaller portions of their resources for engagement in 
voluntary initiatives in order to maintain their profile with their sizable, or at least 
consistent, clientele. Even though this analysis did not provide a unified representation of 
companies employing the competitive advantage technique through voluntary initiative 
engagement, there is some support that larger and smaller companies are more likely to 
become involved in these initiatives; determining exactly why that happens should be the 





Regulatory Avoidance or New Moral Marketplace? 
The regression table above shows a homogenous picture across the different 
models when looking at the SEC litigation documents variable [seclit], but there are some 
inconsistent findings related to measures of EPA regulations. Every model in the analysis 
points to the number of SEC litigation documents [seclit] as being a significant variable 
beyond the p<0.001 threshold, with odds ratios of 32.75, 12.62, and 23.34. This finding is 
the most convincing of the entire analysis, strongly suggesting that companies that have 
been sanctioned by the SEC are significantly more likely to be GC signees. With odds 
ratios between 12 and 32, these findings show that as companies have higher numbers of 
SEC litigation documents filed against them, they are more likely to sign into the GC, 
which supports the regulation avoidance concept suggested earlier. This is consistent with 
the existing literature arguing that when businesses feel regulatory pressure, they are 
increasingly likely to join voluntary initiatives (Whitehouse 2006, Arthaud-Day 2005, 
Whitehouse 2003, Videras and Alberini 2000). It also shows that companies could either 
be attempting to make amends for past wrongdoings or be trying to head off future 
pressure by proactively showing they are attempting to make a difference with their 
corporate actions. These findings also go against the new moral marketplace argument 
that suggests a negative relationship, which would indicate that companies are morally 
driven to engage in voluntary initiatives and are already good world citizens. 
Measures related to the number of EPA sites monitored per company [epasites] 
and the number of EPA violations for each company [epaviol] are not significant, though 




ratios for [epasites] were between 1.0003 and 1.0071, none of which is significant, and 
this gives minimal support that companies that sign the GC are more likely to have a 
higher number of sites being monitored by the EPA, albeit infinitesimally. The findings 
related to the number of EPA violations for each company [epaviol] indicate a similarly 
small, though opposite relationship, with odds ratios falling in between 0.9853 and 
1.0026. It could be argued that this lends some support to the new moral marketplace 
concept that lower violations should be reported for the GC signees, though similar to the 
previous EPA measures, these results do not provide noteworthy support to either the 
regulatory avoidance or the new moral marketplace argument, given the small, 
insignificant odds ratios. These findings are interesting because they suggest that 
companies are not joining because they are overly concerned about the environment 
(morally driven) or because they are looking to head off environmental regulation. The 
number of sites being monitored and the number of violations per company are 
apparently not persuasive, or coercive, enough to drive companies to engage in the 
Global Compact. 
Control Variables 
Model 1 (odds ratio of 3.5678, p<0.05) and Model 3 (odds ratio of 3.3467, p<0.10) 
both indicate that companies based in manufacturing are three times more likely to sign 
the GC. This finding goes against previous research, which states that companies 
involved in the service sector are more likely to become involved in voluntary initiatives 
due to their need to impress customers they continuously interact with; however, given 




taken into consideration. When a company is primarily based in manufacturing, it 
generally has a larger footprint in the community, which makes its actions more visible, 
and possibly detrimental, to the community it is based in. Laws or regulations not 
connected to the SEC or the EPA could be particularly influential in the manufacturing 
community, which could be driving those companies to become more involved in the GC. 
This finding could also be influenced by the larger overall average size of manufacturing-
based companies, which, it could be argued, supports the competitive avoidance 
position.
20
 In other words, companies based in manufacturing are more likely to sign into 
the GC because they are large enough to utilize their resources in this area; however, 
further analysis specifically focused on different industries would assist in determining 
the extent to which this remains a significant finding. 
 The year that the companies have been established [estab] was included in the 
analysis both as a control variable, nullifying possible arguments of company maturity as 
being a missing factor, and an exploratory one, given the lack of previous research 
utilizing this information. The odds ratios across the three models in the analysis range 
from 1.0041 to 1.0068, and not a single model indicated that the age of a company was a 
significant factor for companies in signing the GC. Although this finding did not assist in 
finding new avenues to direct future studies, it did highlight that both young and old 
companies are equally likely to be involved in voluntary initiatives such as the GC and 
thus added to community of research. 
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 The mean number of employees for manufacturing companies is 43,732; for non-manufacturing 
companies, it is 22,986. The total sales (in millions) for manufacturing companies are $20,404.16, while 
this figure is only $7,441.69 for non-manufacturing companies. These higher totals for manufacturing 




The overall argument of corporate social responsibility and voluntary initiatives 
does not fit squarely within the findings of the models examined. The positions that 
companies are either trying to enhance their competitive advantage, attempting to abide 
by the rules of a new moral marketplace, or taking actions to offset potential regulatory 
pressure are not entirely supported by the above analysis. There is some support for the 
competitive advantage approach as it relates to total sales numbers, but the three different 
measures of size are not a significant determining factor for the Global Compact 
membership across the three models. Determining whether regulatory avoidance or the 
new moral marketplace is more influential in driving companies to sign the GC is also 
not easily identifiable, although the strongest support comes from the findings regarding 
SEC litigation documents. Companies that have a high number of SEC litigation 
documents filed against them are the most likely to sign into the GC, with odds ratios 
ranging from 12.62 to 32.27 (p<0.001), indicating this is a highly significant finding 
supporting the regulation avoidance argument. Those companies feeling the most 
pressure from the SEC are much more likely to sign into the GC, perhaps as a potential 
mechanism to establish a good record amongst the corporate community with hopes to 
mitigate additional pressure from the SEC or other regulatory agencies. Findings related 
to EPA regulation were not significant in any of the models used in the analysis. Of the 
two control variables, only [manufact] (whether or not each company is based in 
manufacturing) was significant in one model at the p<0.05 baseline, while the 
establishment date per company ([estab]) did not indicate significance in any of the 






















Chapter VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 The preliminary means tests comparing the variables in this analysis indicate that 
being larger, having a higher number of SEC litigation documents filed against them, 
being based in manufacturing, and being older are key characteristics of the Global 
Compact signees. Participants in the GC have greater overall sales volumes, employ more 
people, and are targets of more regulatory pressure from both the United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission and the Environmental Protection Agency, all of which are 
consistent with previous research on the characteristics of companies involved with 
voluntary initiatives. The GC signees have also been in operation for a longer period 
compared with non-signees, though as mentioned previously, this finding is exploratory 
rather than a test of previous research. These findings lend initial support to the concept 
of regulatory avoidance, through the findings of more pressure being placed on the GC 
signees by the SEC and EPA, and the competitive advantage stance indicated by the 
larger size of the GC signees. The higher number of manufacturing companies being the 
GC participants also lends support to the competitive advantage approach due to their 
average size being much larger than that of non-manufacturing-based companies, though 
as noted previously, this measure could also be influenced by pressures outside of this 
analysis that could provide more evidence for the regulatory avoidance position. These 




higher average violation totals, both through the EPA totals and SEC litigation documents, 
and they were more scrutinized by the EPA, with more sites being monitored per 
company. These preliminary findings only look at the means of the GC signees and non-
signees across these different measures, and multivariate logistic regression is used to 
further examine these relationships. 
 Multivariate regression suggests that the number of SEC litigation documents 
filed against each company proves to be significant in each of the three models, while 
indicators of size (sales and sales squared in Model 1, and employees in Model 2) are 
significant in their respective models. The finding that the number of SEC litigation 
documents per company is significant is consistent with previous literature on voluntary 
initiative engagement, although the strength of the findings (odds ratios of 12.62, 23.34, 
and 32.27) are well beyond the expected outcomes for this variable. This denotes that 
companies that feel regulatory pressure from the SEC are significantly more likely to sign 
into the GC. 
This research suggests that Hess et al.‟s (2002: 112) reasons for joining the GC 
should be expanded to include regulatory avoidance as a possible motive for joining the 
Global Compact. This finding might indicate that companies join to signal to the world 
that they are not entirely “bad” companies. Moreover, it could be that violations that are 
more likely to register on investor‟s radars are through the financial industry watchdog, 
and they respond by taking steps to help mitigate the negative implications that these 
violations may be pointing toward. It may also be the case that companies caught with 
previous, and pending, litigations are in effect reaching out toward established voluntary 




previously invested in the company or are thinking of putting money into new stocks in 
the industry they are operating within. Companies also look to bolster their images in 
communities where their current, and potential, customers live and work. These findings 
suggest that regulatory avoidance could be used as another indicator for voluntary 
initiative engagement beyond the GC, provided the proper theoretical linkages to the 
initiative(s) examined are made. 
The finding that SEC litigation documents are an important predictor of the GC 
engagement and the lack of support from the EPA measurements (sites monitored and 
violations) indicate that the new moral marketplace theory that Hess et al. (2002) propose 
does not significantly influence the companies in this analysis. If the SEC measurement 
variable or one of the EPA-related measures indicated that the GC signees have lower 
totals, it would be an indication that those companies are indeed driven by an internal, 
moral framework; a lack of support from either measure does not entirely negate this 
position, but it certainly does not support the concept either. It could be that the actual 
fines imposed by the EPA do not match those of the SEC, meaning companies are not 
forced to take steps to “correct” their environmental violations with voluntary initiatives 
aimed to help clean their image. If this is true and companies make decisions solely based 
on potential monetary damages, it would provide a much stronger case against the moral 
marketplace argument, thus supporting the regulatory avoidance claim.   
The competitive advantage position received some support from this analysis with 
the finding that larger companies are more prone to sign the GC, though this was only 
found in two out of the three models tested. This loosely supports the assertion that 




the relative costs are lower and, more importantly, so that they can maintain, or even 
bolster, their position in the field they operate within (Khanna et al. 2007). There was also 
evidence indicating that smaller companies are likely to sign into the GC, confirming 
previous research by Amato and Amato (2007), linking smaller organizations to voluntary 
initiative engagement, though again, this finding was inconsistent across the three models 
in the analysis. Very large companies may indeed be using small portions of their vast 
resources to sign into voluntary initiatives in order to bolster their image, or they could 
simply be mirroring actions of other large corporations via mimetic isomorphism (the act 
of companies mirroring one another to remain legitimate in the field they operate in) 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983), something that additional work could potentially explicate. 
 Manufacturing as a primary mode of business operations proved to be significant 
in two of the three models in this analysis. There are a couple of possible reasons for this. 
Companies may want to lessen the impact they have on the communities around them 
due to their large environmental and physical footprints (as a result of greater reliance on 
factories, shipping/hauling, and mineral and resource use). Alternatively, they may be 
seeking to improve their chances of preventing future regulation being placed on their 
industry, by self-promotion of their participation in voluntary initiatives and through (at 
least symbolically) upholding community and environmental values. Manufacturing 
companies were also significantly larger than those not based in this industry, meaning 
that a company‟s size could be a moderating influence on voluntary initiative engagement. 
Future studies could benefit from increasing the specification of industry types to see if 
these findings are present amongst a variety of particular manufacturing firms. Lastly, the 




GC does not point in either direction, and this variable was included in the regression 
analysis to control for possible maturation influences. 
The GC appears to be beneficial not because it reduces financial corruption or 
improves environmental performance, but because it can be used by companies to 
advance the notion that they are willing to police themselves and thus to argue for fewer 
regulations by the state. If regulators were to solely look at the types of agreements that 
companies are willing to sign into, or have signed into, then they could be misled into 
thinking that real changes have taken place where nothing substantial has in fact 
transpired. Taken to an extreme, this would argue for a decrease in regulatory pressure 
and a relaxed attitude toward external compliance measures, subsequently shifting the 
focus toward an increase of self-reports from either individual companies or industries as 
a whole. As this analysis has shown, companies that have signed into the GC are not 
necessarily better world citizens because of doing so; instead, they are, perhaps, just 
better actors on the broad stage of corporate social responsibility. 
Limitations 
 The main limitations of this study are: the number of companies already involved 
in the GC; solely using companies based in the U.S.; the fact that all of the comparison 
companies were found in one database through random simple sampling; the analysis 
being limited to looking at only one voluntary initiative; not taking into account the 
connections between the leaders of these different companies (either to one another or 
with other groups); and the variables used in the analysis. Since the Global Compact is 




in the analysis. This will change over time, and perhaps revisiting this analysis in five to 
ten years may provide a more robust sample size, but the number of companies currently 
involved in the analysis is dictated by the companies available at the time of this work. 
The GC is intended as a worldwide initiative, which makes including all 
companies that have signed into it a simultaneously intriguing and daunting task. To do 
so, a much larger analysis and increased understanding of the cultures, established 
regulations, and practices that each company is based in would be called for, proving to 
be more time- and labor-intensive than this type of a project. This becomes increasingly 
difficult to compare across countries since, as noted previously in Chapter IV, the U.S. 
has much lower participation rates than companies based in Europe, which are the 
majority of the GC signees (United Nations 2008). There are also limitations with finding 
information for each company (not all companies and countries have the same reporting 
standards); nevertheless, if the information were available, it could add an interesting 
contrast to this and previous work. 
The use of more comparison companies is another area where this work could be 
improved, perhaps by including two sets of comparison companies of equal size to that of 
the GC signees to see if these findings prove consistent across multiple groups. Related to 
this, many of the GC companies are the headquarters of various companies included in 
this analysis, and limiting the comparison companies to just headquarters may also alter 
the significance levels in both the means and proportion testing, along with those in the 
logistic regression analysis. 
Although there is a variety of different voluntary initiatives that companies can 




companies involved in the GC and those not involved. One could picture future work 
detailing how companies get involved in various initiatives though qualitative interviews, 
along with looking at how many total voluntary initiatives each company is involved with. 
Both measures could add some additional explanations as to the content and extent of 
involvement for each of the companies in an analysis. 
C. Wright Mills (2000[1956]), among others, discussed the intertwined leaders of 
organizations, and this connectedness of elites among companies could be influential in 
determining how people who serve on multiple boards of directors influence a company‟s 
willingness to join different voluntary initiatives. These leaders could also be linked to 
other non-profit, or not-for-profit, organizations that are either involved or well versed in 
different initiatives. Through these connections, companies can become involved in 
different aspects of various associations or initiatives simply through casual social and 
business connections and not through regulatory avoidance, a new moral drive, or in an 
effort to gain a competitive advantage. 
Additional variables could also prove to be influential in future analysis on 
voluntary initiatives, specifically: the profits generated by each company prior to and 
after their signing into the GC; industry-specific rates of initiative engagement; looking at 
the SEC and EPA violations prior to and after signing into the GC; and media exposure 
(both the number and type of media reports) that companies are subject to. 
Including details about stock prices, quarterly and annual changes of revenues, 
sales, and profits/losses could add to future studies looking at voluntary initiatives. If 
companies see significant positive changes in these measures after signing into the GC, or 




or refuse, to become involved in other voluntary initiatives. This analytic extension could 
provide interesting and fruitful additional ways to look at why companies become 
involved in programs such as the GC, or perhaps why companies prefer not to become 
linked with them. This approach could be particularly useful in examining the 
competitive advantage postulation of initiative engagement if companies that have 
declining profits or stock prices decide to sign into the GC or a similar agreement. 
As the literature surveyed in this work points out, there are trends within 
industries when it comes to becoming involved in particular initiatives or non-binding 
agreements with different groups. Building on this, future work could look at industry-
specific groups (i.e. finance, housing, information technology, etc.) to see if there are 
types, or groups, of industries that are more likely to engage in voluntary initiatives. 
Perhaps, when looking at more specific industry characteristics, a new understanding 
could emerge, detailing many different groups that are most or least likely to join and 
why that might be the case. 
Looking at the number of SEC and EPA violations each company had before 
signing into the GC compared with that number after they signed could also be a way to 
determine whether their signing is simply a symbolic gesture or if they are actually trying 
to change their practices for the better. This could also help in determining to what extent 
companies are engaged in greenwashing, though this would need to be developed more to 
see their true intentions. The degree to which the current financial turmoil and that of the 
Enron/Tyco/Worldcom era have changed participation rates in voluntary initiatives is also 





Lastly, for future analysis, it could be beneficial to see what types of media 
reports are issued regarding each company, whether they are negative or positive, their 
focus, and the number of reports. This could be influential as companies either try to 
change their corporate image or continue to promote the positive one they have 
established. Given that the GC has been around for roughly a decade and that, as 
mentioned previously, there are an ever-increasing number of companies joining the GC 
each year, there will likely be a larger set of companies to analyze in the future. 
Conclusion 
This work suggests that companies with more regulatory pressure from the SEC, 
those that are larger, and those that are based in manufacturing are more likely to sign 
into voluntary initiatives. Much could be added to further increase both the 
generalizability of this analysis by looking at additional voluntary initiatives, other than 
the United Nations Global Compact, and the understanding of factors driving companies 
to engage in any kind of CSR. 
The total number of SEC litigation documents filed against a company is a 
significant finding in this analysis of companies signed into the United Nations Global 
Compact. According to researchers who have examined the reasons for companies to 
engage in corporate social responsibility (Bennie, Bernhagen, and Mitchell 2007; Khanna 
2007; Murray 2004; Alberini 2002; Videras and Alberini 2000), regulation avoidance is 
one of the key motivators for companies to sign into voluntary initiatives, which are often 
reflections of, or are directly connected to, the CSR movement. The focus of recent 




concerning global warming, environmental degradation, and pollution in major cities. 
This work indicates that the focus should be financial in nature if regulatory actors seek 
to utilize this analysis and apply it to encourage more companies to sign into voluntary 
initiatives, with, perhaps, the intention of those companies to initiate positive changes in 
their operations. If attention is turned toward these groups, there may be a greater shift 
toward enhancing the CSR movement rather than a patchwork of new regulations being 
implemented. An important aspect of this analysis is the broader context that it is based in, 
i.e., the U.S., and there is the potential for an even greater focus on short-term financial 
gains/losses in the United States than in other countries or cultures where this might not 
be as influential. 
Determining the true driving force behind this voluntary initiative involvement is 
only possible by sitting in on private meetings among the executives and managers who 
have decided to join an initiative or become involved in the CSR movement, but previous 
literature indicates that there is a whole spectrum of reasons why this happens. These 
range from increasing the apparent good deeds of a company (Besser and Miller 2001), 
genuinely wanting to contribute to the communities they are based in (Brammer 2008), or 
avoiding accountability through voluntary measures (Bruno and Karliner 2002), to 
engaging in any number of greenwashing efforts (Greer and Bruno 1996), but again, it is 
difficult to determine exactly why this happens. Since the Global Compact is a voluntary, 
non-binding initiative, those companies that have signed it are not policed or scrutinized 
for violations. Companies are able to portray their involvement as a symbolic gesture of 
being socially responsible without having to take any measurable steps. This can create a 




increased awareness of their wrongdoing, or both, whether or not real changes take place. 
It has been argued that if companies are able to change the ways they conduct 
themselves to embrace even basic CSR practices their businesses and society in general 
are both going to have a more sustainable future (Whitehouse 2003: 313). It is not 
uncommon for companies, both large and small, to indicate through advertisements, store 
posters, and press releases that they are actively engaging in different levels and types of 
corporate social responsibility. Unless this is measured and their operations are made 
translucent, their claims must be taken with a grain of salt.  
Fortunately, there have been positive signs recently. For example, “in the USA, 
the number of corporate foundations doubled from 1295 to 2549 between 1987 and 2003,” 
and their level of grant giving also doubled in that timeframe to $3.5 billion a year 
(Utting 2007: 699). Although that is not the sole litmus test of CSR and where it is 
headed, it does show that some companies are choosing to engage in a positive dialogue 
with the communities they are based in.  
This study intended to determine whether companies engaging in the GC, a 
voluntary initiative designed to integrate the business community with the ideals of the 
CSR movement, differ from those that have not signed the GC, but the broader intention 
was to look at how CSR can be tested and measured within certain contexts. This work 
adds one more piece to the existing literature, and using this as a framework for further 
studies enables us to better understand the ways that these arguments about CSR are 
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Appendix I. List of Global Compact Signees with Firm Data 






















A T C Group Services Inc 34900 13880.0 1982 9 0 12 17 6 0.35 1 
Accenture Inc 186000 25310.0 1913 0 0 1 4 0 0.00 0 
Adecco Employment Services Inc 4265 165.2 1996 0  0 0 5 1 0.20 0 
Aecom Services Inc 16800 2140.0 1946 3 0 1 10 4 0.40 1 
Anham LLC 410 183.8 2005 0  0 0 7 0 0.00 0 
Ca Inc 13700 4277.0 1976 2 0 28 15 2 0.13 1 
Calvert Group Ltd 2500 1876.0 1981 0 0 10 13 7 0.54 0 
CB Richard Ellis Group Inc 29000 6034.0 1989 5 0 0  49 6 0.12 0 
Ch2m Hill Inc 22000 4420.0 1946 5 5 1 7 0 0.00 0 
Cisco Systems Inc .  .  1984 0  0 0 50 9 0.18 .  
Coca-Cola Enterprises Inc 73024 20940.0 1944 30 1 4 50 6 0.12 1 
Daniel J Edelman Inc 3200 320.0 1952 0  0 18 50 22 0.44 0 
DVS Group . . 2006 11 0 0 . . . . 
Dyncorp International LLC 43000 5194.0 1946 0  0 1 29 2 0.07 0 




eBay Inc 15600 7672.0 1995 1 0  27 50 10 0.20 0 
Engineering & Professional Svc . . 1992 0 0 0 . . . 0 
Fairmount Minerals Ltd 296 380.0 1986 1 0  0 13 3 0.23 1 
Ford Motor Co 246000 172500.0 1903 138 28 16 50 4 0.08 1 
Gap Inc 150000 15760.0 1969 2 0  2 23 12 0.52 0 
General Electric Co 328700 172700.0 1892 33 7 60 50 7 0.14 1 
General Fasteners Co .  .  2008 84 23 0 0 .  . .  
General Mills Inc 29500 13650.0 1928 70 8 6 23 4 0.17 1 
Geoeye Inc 80 24.6 2005 3 0   0 24 4 0.17 0 
Golden Star Resources Ltd 176000 10380.0 1985 14 1 7 16 2 0.13 0 
Green Mountain Coffee Roasters 1220 500.3 1993 2 0   0 37 11 0.30 1 
Hess Corp 13300 31920.0 1920 613 28 2 30 3 0.10 1 
Hewlett-Packard Co 321000 118400.0 1939 56 1 9 50 9 0.18 1 
Hussey Copper Ltd 697 97.3 1848 3 0 0 17 1 0.06 1 
I E Industries Fashions .  .  2001 1 0   0 .  .  . 0 
J C Penney Co Inc 155000 19860.0 1902 70 0 7 23 5 0.22 0 
Johnson Controls Inc 140026 38060.0 1900 114 11 3 34 7 0.21 1 
Kent Security Services Inc 17600 5874.0 1982 0 0 6 10 2 0.20 1 
Ketchum Inc 70000 12690.0 1996  0 0  8 47 16 0.34 0 
KPMG LLP 40816 53510.0 1897 71 37 10 50 4 0.08 1 
Lazare Kaplan International 148 369.7 1903 1 0 4 12 3 0.25 1 
Levi Strauss & Co 10680 4401.0 1850 11 0 1 28 5 0.18 1 
Lexmark International Inc 13800 4974.0 1990 2 0 4 30 8 0.27 1 
Manpower Inc 33120 20500.0 1948 2 0 8 16 3 0.19 0 
Merck & Co Inc 59800 24200.0 1891 23 12 10 50 9 0.18 1 




Mission Essential Personnel 90 43.0 2004 0 0  0 5 0 0.00 0 
National Envelope Corp 3000 255.0 1951 9 0 1 13 5 0.38 1 
Newmont Mining Corp 15000 5526.0 1921 8 0 2 24 4 0.17 1 
Nike Inc 32500 18630.0 1964 22 0 7 50 15 0.30 1 
North American Communications 3323 46.6 1993 1 0  0 19 2 0.11 0 
Omanhene Cocoa Bean Co 66143 39540.0 1984 26 0 23 6 1 0.17 1 
P A E Government Services Inc 140000 41860.0 1991 0 0  0 7 2 0.29 0 
PA Consulting Group Inc 2100 854.5 1973 5 5 0 7 3 0.43 0 
PepsiCo Inc 185000 39470.0 1919 7 3 8 50 17 0.34 1 
PerkinElmer Inc 8713 1787.0 1947 10 2 5 25 6 0.24 1 
Pfizer Inc 86600 48420.0 1849 37 10 11 42 12 0.29 1 
Precision Engineered Products 868 62.4 2003 1   3 0 0.00 1 
Ruder Finn Inc 580 34.0 1948 1 0 2 50 19 0.38 1 
Ryerson Inc 5700 1804.0 1893 8 0 5 42 11 0.26 0 
Seagate Technology LLC 41500 11270.0 2000 15 3 1 50 6 0.12 1 
Small Parts Inc 800 85.0 1958 4 0 0 6 0 0.00 1 
Soc-Smg Inc 55 11.0 2003 3 0 1 4 0 0.00 0 
Starbucks Corp 1680 175.6 1985 2 0 0 39 7 0.18 1 
Sun Microsystems Inc 1738 135.2 1982 0 0  0 49 6 0.12 0 
Symantec Corp 1000 11.3 1982 0 0 4 50 9 0.18 0 
The Cleveland Clinic Foundation 20000 4399.0 1921 10 0  0 50 9 0.18 0 
The Coca-Cola Co 90500 28860.0 1886 354 24 1 33 8 0.24 1 
The Dow Chemical Co 22000 4800.0 1897  0  0  0 42 7 0.17 0 
Timberland Co 6300 1436.0 1933 8 1 10 50 13 0.26 1 
Unified Technologies Group Inc 200 2.2 2003 0 0 0 4 0 0.00 0 




Virtusa Corp 37000 30960.0 1996 1 0 1 23 0 0.00 0 
Visteon Corp 54000 11360.0 2000 14 0 5 33 8 0.24 1 


















Appendix II. List of Comparison Companies with Firm Data  






















A G I - Camelot Inc 34300 789.8 . 0 0 0 . . . 0 
ABC Imaging Of Washington Inc 500 32.6 1985 1 0  0 9 0 0.00 1 
Accreditation Association 35 9.8 1979 0 0 0 3 0 0.00 0 
Advion Biosciences Inc 190 17.1 1993 3  0  0 21 1 0.05 0 
All Major Appliances Inc 32 9.8 1996 0 0 0 2 0 0.00 0 
Angler's Mini-Mart Inc 14221 8996.0 1977 2  0  0 4 0 0.00 0 
Appro International Inc 50 12.9 1991 0 0 0 11 3 0.27 1 
Architectural Textiles USA Inc 90 16.2 1978 5 0  0 4 0 0.00 0 
Battery Acquisition & Devpt 678 86.2 1999 5 5 0 2 0 0.00 0 
Bbt Realty Inc 7540 1.2 1980 26  0  0 1 0 0.00 0 
Bill Jacobs LLC 55 17.1 1989 8 1 0 3 1 0.33 0 
Bob King Inc 52 14.1 1968 2 1 1 3 1 0.33 0 
Bremer Insurance Inc 1800 33.7 1962 11 0 0 3 0 0.00 0 
C & T Landfills 13000 3176.0 1994 1  0  0 1 0 0.00 0 
Cardsmart Inc 6 60.0 1997 1 0 0 1 0 0.00 0 
Childrens Defense Fund 166 25.1 1969  0 0  0 36 21 0.58 0 
Children's Hospital Home Care 450 7.5 1984 0 0 0 6 5 0.83 0 
Clartech Inc 3 11.0 1992 1  0  0 1 0 0.00 0 
Cloverland Dairy LP 450 99.3 1929 2 28 0 11 1 0.09 1 
Coborn's Inc 6000 967.9 1921 1  0 0 18 3 0.17 0 




Colonial Pipeline Co 634 824.1 1961 84 23  0 16 1 0.06 1 
Com Tech Plastics Inc 75 28.0 1985 70 8 0 2 0 0.00 1 
CPS Color Inc 10008 4125.0 1996  0  0  0 3 1 0.33 1 
Ddp Holdings Inc . 28.1 1992 2 0 0 1 0 0.00 0 
East Richland Community Unit 300 10.1 .  1  0  0 6 4 0.67 0 
Ferguson Enterprises Inc 78948 32490.0 . 7 2 2 2 0 0.00 0 
Ford Green Sales Inc 40 18.2 1962 1 1  0 4 1 0.25 0 
Four County Mental Health Ctr 165 12.0 1964 3 0 0 11 5 0.45 0 
Fremont Industries Inc 120 15.7 1954 1  0  0 10 2 0.20 1 
G & G Electric Supply Co Inc 36 24.0 1914 70 0 0 4 1 0.25 0 
G T S Staffing 1016 47.3 1998 114 11  0 2 1 0.50 0 
Gary-Williams Production Co 296 35.0 1993 0 0 0 4 0 0.00 1 
Ginop Sales Inc 31 17.1 1959  0  0  0 6 1 0.17 0 
Gma Electrical Corp 60 14.5 1993 0 0 0 2 2 1.00 0 
Healthcare Intelistaf Mgt 1150 482.3 1995 1  0  0 1 0 0.00 0 
Heartwood LLC 2570 953.9 2001 1 0 0 2 1 0.50 0 
J Kings Food Service 350 154.5 1974 1  0 0 1 0 0.00 0 
Jacor Communications Co 29000 2417.0 1979 2 0 0 4 0 0.00 0 
Kimco Linda Mar 1115 Inc 726 681.6 .  23 12  0 .   . . 0 
Kreisner Automotive Group LLC 36 22.0 1999 3 1 0 3 1 0.33 0 
L C A Acquisition Corp 50 16.1 1988  0  0  0 9 1 0.11 0 
Lee Bank 46 16.0 1852 9 1 1 5 1 0.20 0 
Lgh Health Enterprises Inc 1405 22.6 1985 8  0  0 3 2 0.67 0 
Lumos & Associates Inc 130 13.5 1978 2 0 0 5 1 0.20 0 
Mid Atlantic Machinery Inc 13 16.0 1991 1  0  0 3 1 0.33 0 




Nova Chemicals Inc 3270 6732.0 1998 5 5  0 12 4 0.33 1 
Ortho Biotech Holding Corp 120390 61100.0 2002 7 3 0 1 1 1.00 0 
Otter Tail Corp 4099 1239.0 1907 13 2  0 21 7 0.33 1 
Pa Office Of Deaf & Hard Of 87707 . 1986 37 10 0 2 1 0.50 0 
Parts House Inc 31820 10840.0 1997 1  0  0 1 0 0.00 0 
Placer Electric Inc 85 11.3 1978 1 0 0 3 1 0.33 0 
Polk County Board of Education 207 6.8 1900 1  0  0 5 3 0.60 0 
Pureservice Corp 182 3.5 1980 14 0 0 3 3 1.00 0 
Resource Spectrum Inc 560 87.4 1990 4  0  0 7 1 0.14 0 
Reunion Industries Inc 349 59.5 1929 0 0 0 7 1 0.14 1 
Rftrax Inc 400 0.2 2004 14 1  0 3 1 0.33 0 
Roberts & Oake Inc 375 69.2 1957 9 0 0 1 0 0.00 0 
S Overton Inc 6250 969.4 1970  0  0  0 4 0 0.00 0 
Sonora Cafe Inc 600 36.5 1982 10 0 0 2 1 0.50 0 
Sun Publications of Florida 600 52.4 1989 1 24  0 10 3 0.30 1 
Sutherland Building Material 190 23.3 1964 71 37 0 3 1 0.33 0 
Syl-Mar Investment Corp Inc 20 11.5 1985 0  0  0 4 3 0.75 0 
Techni-Cast Corp 95 18.4 1954 1 1 0 5 3 0.60 1 
Tektronix International Inc 50000 11030.0 1946 3 1 1 4 1 0.25 1 
Unit Parts Co 7971 744.6 2006 1 0 0 5 1 0.20 1 
Valley Slurry Seal Co 437 55.0 1951 0  0 0  5 1 0.20 1 
Whitney Point Central School 325 11.0 1935 1 3 0 9 5 0.56 0 
Williams Production Rmt Co 4319 10560.0 1980 183 13 0  6 1 0.17 0 
 
